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Sean Hannon Williams* 
 
This Article seeks to resurrect an ancient technology for enhancing 
the welfare of others: peer advice. For decisions as variable as whether to 
eat a marshmallow or which dialysis treatment to undergo, advice-giving 
is a powerful and as-yet-unrecognized debiasing tool. In fact, it is one of 
the most comprehensive and effective debiasing tools ever studied. People 
who succumb to motivated reasoning, hyperbolic discounting, and a host 
of other biases offer advice that is untainted by them. When advising 
others, we are more creative, process information and probability more 
rationally, and see the forest rather than the trees. Far from the blind 
leading the blind, our friends and family see us and our situation far more 
clearly than we do. Currently, peer advice is an entirely untapped 
resource. Promoting, incentivizing, or even sometimes mandating advice 
can help us improve our decision-making in numerous contexts such as 
consumer contracts, health care, education, and financial planning. 
  
 
* © 2021 Sean Hannon Williams. F. Scott Baldwin Research Professor in Law, 
University of Texas School of Law. Thanks to Joseph Fishkin, William Forbath, Angela 
Littwin, Susan Morris, and Lior Strahelivitz for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All 
mistakes are mine.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Legal scholarship is awash with novel proposals to promote welfare. The 
behavioral law and economics tradition has brought nudges and choice architecture 
into the mainstream.1 Related work highlights the ways that corporations know us 
better than we know ourselves and could be forced to disclose useful information 
about us.2 More recent scholarship focuses on the futuristic possibility of using big 
data and artificial intelligence (AI) to dynamically generate personalized legal 
 
1 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (2008). 
2 Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS 
L. REV. 93, 95 (2010). 
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directives for each person in every situation.3 As scholars explore these new 
strategies and new technologies, they should be careful not to lose sight of older and 
sometimes more effective ones. This Article seeks to resurrect an ancient technology 
for enhancing the welfare of others: advice from friends and family.  
The first novel insight of this Article is that corporations are not the only ones 
who know us better than we know ourselves. Long before AI and big data, friends 
and family accomplished similar feats with HI (Human Intelligence). Across a 
number of domains, others can make more accurate predictions about our lives than 
we can. This is true even of the most intimate aspects of our lives. Other people are 
better than you at predicting your personality traits, who you’ll be dating in a year, 
whether you’ll be fired from your job, whether you’ll die of a heart attack, what 
grade you’ll get on the next exam, whether you’ll donate to charity, and much more.4 
These epistemic advantages are especially surprising given that other people often 
judge based on far less information than we ourselves possess. Although they have 
less information, they process it far more effectively.  
The second novel insight of this Article is that advice-giving is a powerful yet 
completely unexplored debiasing tool.5 The psychological distance between 
advisors and advisees allows even non-expert advisors to process information free 
from the distorting influence of the fundamental attribution error, confirmation bias, 
and other forms of motivated reasoning.6 Advisors also give advice that is untainted 
by ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, betrayal aversion, omission bias, and 
hyperbolic discounting.7  
Marshmallows can help provide a concrete illustration. What happens when 
you put a marshmallow in front of a three-year-old? They eat it.8 What if you tell 
 
3 See infra Part IV.A. 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 Other legal scholarship asks whether, and under what circumstances, taking expert 
advice can help people make better decisions. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, 
at 141 (discussing experts with conflicts of interest); Christopher Tarver Robertson, Biased 
Advice, 60 EMORY L.J. 653, 665–69 (2011); Justin Sevier & Kelli Alces Williams, 
Consumers, Seller-Advisors, and the Psychology of Trust, 59 B.C. L. REV. 931, 990 (2018) 
(discussing consumer trust in expert advisors with conflicts of interest). This work focuses 
on the incentives or biases of experts and is not necessarily about debiasing laypersons at all. 
Taking a financial planner’s advice can lead to better outcomes (like more retirement 
savings) even if you are still biased when making your own decisions. This is the first piece 
of legal scholarship to argue that the process of giving advice has a debiasing effect, at least 
for non-experts without conflicts of interest. This is also the first piece of legal scholarship 
to explore the benefits of peer advice rather than expert advice.  
6 See infra Part II.A.1. These or other distortions may exist when advisors have conflicts 
of interest, such as when a professional advisor is paid more when you make a worse 
decision. These conflicts of interest are unlikely to significantly affect most peer advice. See 
id. 
7 See infra notes 82, 90 and accompanying text. 
8 See WALTER MISCHEL, THE MARSHMALLOW TEST: MASTERING SELF-CONTROL 47 
(2014); see also The Telegraph, The Marshmallow Test: Can Children Learn Self-Control?, 
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them that, if they refrain from eating it, they will get two marshmallows later? The 
child’s ability to wait correlates with various outcomes later in life, like SAT scores.9 
For our purposes, the most interesting finding of this research comes when 
researchers allow children to give each other advice. Three-year-olds recommend 
that others delay gratification to earn extra treats, even when they cannot overcome 
their own visceral desires to do so themselves.10 To put the point in more technical 
terms, the same people who routinely succumb to hyperbolic discounting will give 
advice that is unaffected by this bias. 
Third, even outside of the traditional set of heuristics and biases, advice has 
immense benefits. Even rational people might experience literacy or numeracy 
limits. Advice can help people overcome literacy and numeracy issues because 
advice harnesses the power of other people’s experiences. Consider a thought 
experiment about Miranda warnings. Some scholars have wondered whether 
Miranda warnings should be simplified to make them easier to understand.11 This 
might help overcome some literacy concerns. But experience might well be a better 
teacher. It might tell you not to talk to the police. Advice can harness that experience. 
Suppose the police could not question you until after they read you the Miranda 
warnings and you called two friends to receive advice. What might those friends 
say? Probably something like: “Keep your mouth shut.” I’m not advocating this 
particular reform, but it begins to show that we might make much different (and 
perhaps much more rational) decisions if we tapped into peer advice.  
Advice also mitigates overload effects. People just don’t have time to read all 
of the relevant information about consumer products, retirement, or their health 
status. Trying to do so would be overwhelming. Peer advisors do better. They try 
harder, make more rational investments in searching for and processing information, 
and are less susceptible to overload effects and decision fatigue.12 Relatedly, people 
who suffer from high anxiety make choices for others that are not hampered by this 
trait.13  
 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8M7Xzjy_m8 
[https://perma.cc/4VQX-BZGS]. 
9 Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Phillip K. Peake, Predicting Adolescent Cognitive 
and Self-Regulatory Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying 
Diagnostic Conditions, 26 DEV. PSYCH. 978, 980–82 (1990); see also Tanya R. Schlam, 
Nicole L. Wilson, Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Ozlem Ayduk, Preschoolers’ Delay of 
Gratification Predicts Their Body Mass 30 Years Later, 162 J. PEDIATRICS 90, 90 (2013).  
10 Angela Prencipe & Philip David Zelazo, Development of Affective Decision Making 
for Self and Other: Evidence for the Integration of First- and Third-Person Perspectives, 16 
PSYCH. SCI. 501, 503 (2005) (testing children with various “treats” like candy, stickers, and 
pennies). 
11 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and 
Machine, 97 B.U. L. REV. 935, 938, 959–60 (2017). 
12 See infra Part II.A.4. 
13 Laura D. Wray & Eric R. Stone, The Role of Self-Esteem and Anxiety in Decision 
Making for Self Versus Others in Relationships, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 125, 129, 
131–32 (2005). 
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Advice-giving even increases creativity. Consider the following riddle: 
 
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found a rope in his 
cell that was half as long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. 
He divided the rope in half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How 
could he have done this?14  
 
People are more likely to solve riddles like this when they imagine that another 
person is in the tower, and that they are solving the riddle for them.15 More generally, 
people tend to be more creative and more likely to see the big picture when they 
advise others, compared to when they make decisions for themselves.16  
These diverse studies paint a single picture: even non-expert advisors will tend 
to point people in welfare-enhancing directions. A related body of research shows 
that advisees tend to respond by moving in that direction. Advisees routinely follow 
good advice, discount bad advice, and respond sensibly to many features of the 
advice context.17 Although at first blush, readers may have thought that peer advice 
would just be the blind leading the blind, nothing could be further from the truth. 
Overall, people who take the perspective of the advisor are not blind, and they can 
offer valuable guidance to those of us who are. Peer advice could be a powerful tool 
and improve decision-making in a host of substantive areas, like small value loan 
markets, consumer contracts, retirement saving, student debt, health, and lay risk 
assessment.  
If peer advice is a resource worth tapping into, the next question is how to do 
so. This Article explores several strategies. These could include providing incentives 
for people to seek advice, advising people to seek advice, or promoting norms that 
support advice. Interestingly, advising people just to simulate advice by asking them 
what their family might say, or what advice they would give a friend, carries many 
of the same benefits as receiving advice.18 Just as the “what would Jesus do” 
movement uses this strategy to improve moral reasoning, policymakers could use it 
to improve decision-making in a host of other domains.  
The Article then takes a futuristic turn. Everyday traditional advice has an 
important role to play even in a hypothetical future where AI can predict our goals 
and how best to achieve them. Recent scholarship on personalized law takes an 
extremely optimistic view of technological progress and envisions powerful AIs 
 
14 Evan Polman & Kyle J. Emich, Decisions for Others Are More Creative than 
Decisions for the Self, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 492, 496 (2011). 
15 Id. at 496 (finding that less than half of the subjects solved the above riddle when 
they imagined themselves in the tower, but two-thirds of people solved the riddle when they 
imagined another person was in the tower). The answer to the riddle is in footnote 95. 
16 Id. at 494–95.  
17 See infra Part II.B.  
18 See infra Part III.B. 
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sifting through massive amounts of real-time data about each and every one of us.19 
These AIs may have access to your bank records, web searches, texts, real-time data 
on your heart rate and sleep patterns, etc. They may be able to predict your 
personality traits, fleeting moods, goals, and dreams. As this literature has noticed, 
an AI this knowledgeable may be able to offer exceedingly accurate advice.20 But 
our traditional practices of advice-giving maintain several important benefits, even 
in this future world. People are more likely to listen to advice or credit factual 
assertions when they trust the speaker. For high stakes decisions, trust is more a 
function of emotional connection and less about expertise.21 Even holding trust 
constant, emotional connections allow others to influence us. Friends and family can 
influence us in ways that strangers cannot, regardless of how much we believe the 
stranger is an expert in whatever field is most relevant to the decision at hand. 
Accordingly, AI advice and peer advice have complementary strengths. The former 
has exceedingly accurate content. The latter can bundle content in emotionally 
cognizant packaging that makes people more likely to hear and heed the advice. 
Hybrid approaches can capture the best of each. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II canvases the psychological literature 
on non-expert peer advice. It argues that advice-giving has powerful debiasing 
effects and that people tend to use advice to improve their decisions. Part III explores 
ways to tap into advice and use it as a regulatory resource. Part IV provides several 
illustrations of hybrid systems where peer advice and AI each have important roles 
to play, even in a hypothetical future where AI advice is personalized and 
exceedingly accurate. Part V concludes.  
 
II.  THE POWER OF ADVICE 
 
We have all given advice; we have all received advice. We probably have a 
fairly good common sense feel for what advice is. Nonetheless, a more formal 
account will be useful. Perhaps most quintessentially, advice is a “specific 
recommendation concerning what the decision-maker ought to do.”22 Advice also 
 
19 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 
92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1402, 1409 (2017) (“Imagine a world where lawmakers enact a catalog of 
precisely tailored laws, specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every situation. The 
lawmakers have enough information to anticipate virtually all contingencies, such that laws 
are perfectly calibrated to their purpose—they are neither over- nor underinclusive.”); 
Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer 
Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309, 312 (2019) (“With the help of big data, 
it could be possible to provide consumers with information that is tailored to their situations, 
personalities, demographic characteristics, and cognitive capabilities.”). 
20 Sean Hannon Williams, AI Advice, FLA. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
on file with author).  
21 See infra note 283.  
22 Reeshad S. Dalal & Silvia Bonaccio, What Types of Advice Do Decision-Makers 
Prefer?, 112 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 11, 11–12 (2010). 
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includes recommendations against certain actions.23 Accordingly, we would all 
recognize statements like the following as advice: “Apply to a safety school,” “Don’t 
go to Florida during hurricane season,” and “Dump him, now!”24 Advice can also 
be about the process of decision-making rather than the final decision.25 For 
example, “Make sure to consider Y and Z when deciding what to do” is a form of 
advice.  
Readers are unlikely to question the value of expert advice. Doctors, lawyers, 
and financial advisors all provide advice about decisions or decisional processes. 
Doctors might advise you to stop smoking. Lawyers might recommend that you 
consider the cost and length of litigation before filing suit. Financial advisors might 
suggest that you save more for retirement. At least when these advisors do not have 
conflicts of interest, their specialized knowledge allows them to offer useful advice.  
This Article explores the benefits of peer advice rather than expert advice. Peer 
advice includes everyday advice from friends, family, acquaintances, and even 
strangers.26 These people have no special training. To align the discussion with the 
available research, this Part will focus on personalized advice offered by one 
individual to another where the advisor does not have any significant conflicts of 
interest. This fairly describes a great deal of advice between friends and family. 
Unlike professional advisors, friends and family members will not normally have 
conflicts of interest; they want us to do well and will not have any other direct stake 
in the relevant decision.27 Much advice is also personalized for the advisee rather 
than meant to be heard by a large group of others.28 The discussion will also set aside 
group decision-making dynamics, which might be relevant when a group of people 
deliberate about what advice to give.29 Peer advice includes a great deal of everyday 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. Most people are not lawyers, and so most people don’t try to parse language as 
precisely as lawyers commonly do. “I would not do that if I were you,” is not a 
recommendation, at least grammatically speaking. It is a disclosure. But the context in which 
those words were spoken might well make it clear that it is a form of advice. 
25 Id. 
26 In the economics literature, this is sometimes called “naive advice” to clarify its 
contrast to expert advice. Julia Sprenger, Naïve Advice in Financial Decision Making: 
Hidden Costs of a Free Offer, RUHR ECON. PAPERS, No. 656 (2016); Andrew Schotter, 
Decision Making with Naive Advice, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 196, 196 (2003). But as this Article 
will illustrate, peer advice is anything but naive.  
27 Of course, this is not always the case. A greedy daughter may advise her elderly 
parents in ways that maximize her future inheritance rather than her parents’ welfare.  
28 A blog post might include generalized advice of the latter sort. 
29 For an overview of group decision-making dynamics and how they are subject to 
different distortions than individual decision-making, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN & 
REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER (2015). 
For an overview of advice-taking by groups, see Lyn M. Van Swol & Andrew Prahl, Giving 
and Receiving Advice in Groups, Networks, and Organizations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF ADVICE 111, 112–17 (Erina L. MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018). Group 
dynamics are unlikely to be relevant to most everyday advice, with the possible exception of 
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advice between friends and family members, where for example, one friend talks 
with another friend over coffee about what they should do. 
Peer advice can be a potent force for enhancing the welfare of both advisee and 
advisor. Advice is often surprisingly good, and people often listen to good advice.30 
Research shows that advisors largely avoid the heuristics and biases that bog us 
down when we make decisions for ourselves. When giving advice, people process 
information more rationally, are more motivated to find the best solution, and are 
more creative problem solvers. Advisees seem to appreciate these advantages, at 
least implicitly. They listen to advice. More specifically, good advice tends to 
influence people’s choices in positive ways, while bad advice is more quickly 
discounted. Peer advice may not always recommend the optimal solution, but it does 
seem to do a fairly good job of moving people in welfare-enhancing directions. This 




spouses. Spouses might deliberate about what advice to give their adult child or whether to 
take the advice of their financial planner. But even here, research on group decision-making 
seems like a poor fit. Spouses are a very unique “group” that merit their own specialized 
research. For an overview of research that focuses specifically on spousal communication 
and decision-making, see Tara L. Queen, Cynthia A. Berg & William Lowrance, A 
Framework for Decision Making in Couples Across Adulthood, in AGING AND DECISION 
MAKING: EMPIRICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 371, 372 (Thomas Hess, JoNell Strough 
& Corinna E. Löckenhoff eds., 2015) (“The existing work on decision making in couples is 
in its infancy and only scratches the surface of the potential for our understanding of the 
phenomenon.”).  
30 This Article defines “good” in welfarist terms. A rough definition of good advice 
would therefore be advice that, if followed, would lead the advisee to make a decision that 
is more welfare-enhancing than the decision she would have made absent the advice. This is 
only a rough definition. For example, it does not address the potentially thorny issue of 
advisors who rely on reverse psychology and offer facially welfare-reducing 
recommendations in the hopes that the advisee will do the opposite. A fuller definition might 
also grapple with the proper definition of the underlying concept of welfare, the magnitudes 
of the relevant welfare gains, and variations in the probability of heeding a particular piece 
of advice. Nonetheless, the rough definition is sufficient for the purposes of this Article.  
31 Other legal scholars mention advice, but do not discuss everyday peer advice. Omri 
Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider claim that people “want advice,” not mandated disclosure. 
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE 
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 185 (2014). Their brief discussion does not mention 
personalized peer advice. Rather, they offer examples of non-personalized expert advice (US 
News, Consumer Reports), personalized expert advice from professional advisors (brokers, 
doctors), and aggregated non-personalized peer opinions (star ratings on Amazon or eBay). 
Id. at 185–86; see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More than You Wanted to Know 
About the Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 64, 71 (2015) 
(noting that Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s definition of advice, when applied to star ratings, 
is more aptly called “opinion data as disclosure”). 
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A.  Giving Advice: The Blind Leading the Blind? 
 
At first blush, one might think that peer advice does not have much to offer. On 
the standard law and economics account, we are all rational and will optimally invest 
in information.32 Here, either people will already seek advice or advice is not 
necessary. Under the standard behavioral law and economics account, we all suffer 
from various biases that impede decision-making.33 But if the advisor also suffers 
from biases, how is she supposed to provide competent advice? This brings to mind 
the following parable: “[I]f the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.”34 
This section confronts the many ways in which this parable does not apply to advice.  
 
1.  Motivated Reasoning and the Benefits of Perspective 
 
Just as corporations might know us better than we know ourselves,35 other 
people can know us better than we know ourselves. Across a number of domains, 
others can make more accurate predictions about our lives than we can. This is true 
even of the most intimate aspects of our lives. Suppose you are dating someone and 
you want to know whether you will still be dating them in a year. What should you 
do? Ask your mom. Or your roommate. Both make more accurate predictions than 
you would.36 Even more telling, once you have the predictions of your mom and 
your roommate, how much new information can you yourself provide? None.37 Your 
 
32 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6, 134. 
33 Id. at 23. 
34 Matthew 15:14 (King James); see also Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 31, at 71 (noting 
that consumer-created star ratings are unlikely to help consumers avoid harmful boilerplate 
when no one reads it, not even the consumers creating the star ratings).  
35 Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, 
Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized 
Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 582 (2019) (“[B]usinesses know at least as much about 
consumers as consumers know about themselves, and sometimes even more.”). 
36 Tara MacDonald & Michael Ross, Assessing the Accuracy of Predictions About 
Dating Relationships: How and Why Do Lovers’ Predictions Differ from Those Made by 
Observers?, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1417, 1423–24 (1999). Anyone who is 
familiar with the literature on overoptimism might think some of these results are 
unsurprising. But the students’ self-predictions were not wrong merely because they were 
too optimistic. In fact, the students in this study were surprisingly realistic. On average, they 
predicted that there was only a 70% chance that they would be together in a year. Id. at 1422. 
Parents and roommates were less optimistic, but not overwhelmingly so. Parents predicted a 
50% chance that the relationship would survive, and roommates gave the couple 60-40 odds. 
Id. So your inability to assess your own fate is not merely the result of being crazy in love. 
It implicates a much larger range of biases related to processing information. That is, couples 
may have all the information they need to accurately predict relationship outcomes, but they 
don’t use that information. Other studies show similar results. See, e.g., Timothy Loving, 
Predicting Dating Relationship Fate with Insiders’ and Outsiders’ Perspectives: Who and 
What Is Asked Matters, 12 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 349, 359 (2006). 
37 MacDonald & Ross, supra note 36, at 1422. 
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predictions—based on the vast amount of extra information that you have—are 
basically useless. Others’ epistemic benefits are not limited to the romantic domain. 
Surgical residents, like most other people, are overly optimistic about many things.38 
Their self-predictions fail to correlate with their scores on standardized tests or 
qualitative evaluations from their supervising doctors.39 But the predictions of their 
peers are highly correlated with both measures of success.40 Studies of 
undergraduate grades show similar results. Peers can predict your grade on the next 
exam as accurately as you can, and they can achieve this accuracy with far less 
information than you possess.41 Particularly relevant to many financial matters, 
advisors are also more accurate than you at predicting whether you will experience 
changes in income. When naval officers rated their own leadership skills, the 
resulting scores were uncorrelated with later promotions.42 But those officers’ 
subordinates were not so blind. Their ratings of the officers’ leadership skills 
correlated with future success.43 Will your narcissism or paranoia get you fired? Ask 
your peers. Peer ratings of these and other personality disorders, but not self-ratings, 
correlated with early discharge from the Air Force.44 Others can even be better at 
predicting your likelihood of dying from heart disease.45 
How can others make better predictions than we make for ourselves? This is 
especially puzzling given that those others normally have far less information than 
we do. Others outperform us not because they have more information, but because 
they process information in a less biased way.  
 
38 Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism 
in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 
742–43 (2009) (“Compared to others, people overwhelmingly think that they are smarter, 
better drivers, better leaders, better managers, better workers, healthier, more socially skilled, 
more sensitive, more ethical, more charitable, more likely to vote, more productive, and 
(ironically) less susceptible to optimistic biases.”). 
39 D. A. Risucci, A. J. Tortolani & R. J. Ward, Ratings of Surgical Residents by Self, 
Supervisors and Peers, 169 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 519, 519–21 (1989). 
40 Id. 
41 Erik G. Helzer & David Dunning, Why and When Peer Prediction Is Superior to Self-
Prediction: The Weight Given to Future Aspiration Versus Past Achievement, 103 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 38, 41–43 (2012). 
42 Bernard M. Bass & Francis J. Yammarino, Congruence of Self and Others’ 
Leadership Ratings of Naval Officers for Understanding Successful Performance, 40 
APPLIED PSYCH. 437, 450 (1991). 
43 Id. 
44 Edna R. Fiedler, Thomas F. Oltmanns & Eric Turkheimer, Traits Associated with 
Personality Disorders and Adjustment to Military Life: Predictive Validity of Self and Peer 
Reports, 169 MIL. MED. 207, 207 (2004). 
45 Timothy W. Smith, Bert N. Uchino, Cynthia A. Berg, Paul Florsheim, Gale Pearce, 
Melissa Hawkins, Nancy J. M. Henry, Ryan M. Beveridge, Michelle A. Skinner, Paul N. 
Hopkins & Hyo-Chun Yoon, Associations of Self-Reports Versus Spouse Ratings of Negative 
Affectivity, Dominance, and Affiliation with Coronary Artery Disease: Where Should We 
Look and Who Should We Ask When Studying Personality and Health?, 27 HEALTH PSYCH. 
676, 676 (2008). 
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Self-predictions are plagued by motivated reasoning.46 “How good a student 
are you?” “Will you donate to charity?” When people answer these questions, they 
rely too heavily on their aspirations and goals. But when they answer similar 
questions about others, they rely on past behavior and verifiable data. Others are 
what they have done; I am what I hope to be.47  
Put another way, people are incredibly accurate social psychologists but 
abysmal self-psychologists.48 People are anywhere between roughly and shockingly 
accurate at predicting others’ behavior. They can predict how many of their peers 
will donate to charity,49 how many of their peers will allow their current fleeting 
mood to affect their donation,50 how many of their peers will cooperate in a 
 
46 Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review, 
9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 309 (2013) (“The modern day psychological theory of 
motivated reasoning holds that when decision makers have a preference regarding the 
outcome of an evaluative task, they are more likely to arrive at that desired conclusion by 
engaging in inadvertently biased processes for accessing, constructing, and evaluating 
beliefs.” (internal quotes omitted)); Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Mechanics of 
Motivated Reasoning, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136 (2016) (“Most people do not reason like 
impartial judges, but instead recruit evidence like attorneys, looking for evidence that 
supports a desired belief while trying to steer clear of evidence that refutes it.”); see, e.g., 
Elanor F. Williams & Thomas Gilovich, The Better-Than-My-Average Effect: The Relative 
Impact of Peak and Average Performances in Assessments of the Self and Others, 48 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 556, 556–61 (2012) (finding that most people pick their most 
attractive photo as the most representative one, but they choose a more average photo when 
making this same choice for others).  
47 Elanor F. Williams & Thomas Gilovich, Conceptions of the Self and Others Across 
Time, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1037, 1040 (2008). In the most thorough 
examination of this dynamic, students were asked to predict another person’s grade and 
asked to help another student predict theirs. They were given monetary incentives for 
accuracy. That is, they were paid if they accurately predicted the other student’s grade, and 
they were paid again if the other student accurately predicted theirs. When they were asked 
what information they wanted from the other student, they asked for past exam scores. But 
when they were asked what information they wanted to give to the other student, they mostly 
chose to pass along the score that they hoped to get. Id. at 1038–40; see also Helzer & 
Dunning, supra note 41, at 42–43. 
48 See generally Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, Considering the Situation: Why 
People Are Better Social Psychologists than Self-Psychologists, 12 SELF & IDENTITY 1 
(2013) [hereinafter Balcetis & Dunning, Considering the Situation]. 
49 Emily Balcetis & David A. Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins: How Situational 
Experience Diminishes Dispositionism in Social Inference, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 
BULL. 102, 107 (2008) [hereinafter Balcetis & Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins] (finding that 
subjects predicted 44% of people would buy a flower, and 29% did). 
50 Balcetis & Dunning, Considering the Situation, supra note 48, at 8–11. 
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prisoner’s dilemma,51 and how many will help another person.52 They also 
understand that base rates are an important source of information when predicting 
another’s behavior.53 But these insights falter when people make predictions about 
themselves.54  
Perhaps most surprisingly, others are better at identifying your personality traits 
than you are.55 Overall, other-ratings of the big five personality traits—
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and openness—
are much more predictive of outcomes like GPA than self-rated personality traits.56  
One of the big five—conscientiousness—is particularly relevant to financial 
decisions.57 Conscientiousness reflects the tendency to be organized, responsible, 
 
51 Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving 
Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 861, 864 (2000) (finding that subjects predicted that 64% of their peers would 
cooperate during a prisoner’s dilemma game, and 61% actually cooperated). 
52 Balcetis & Dunning, Considering the Situation, supra note 48, at 6–8 (finding that 
subjects predicted that others would be 22 percentage points more likely to help a person 
who spilled a 300 piece puzzle on the floor if they were alone and when researchers actually 
spilled puzzle pieces in front of other students, subjects turned out to be 27 percentage points 
more likely to help if they were alone). 
53 Emily Balcetis, Claiming a Moral Minority, Saccades Help Create a Biased 
Majority: Tracking Eye Movements to Base Rates in Social Predictions, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCH. 970, 971 (2009) (finding that subjects consulted base-rate information about 
twice as often when making predictions about others than when making self-predictions). 
54 Id.; Balcetis & Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins, supra note 49, at 107 (finding that 
83% of subjects predicted that they would buy a flower, but only 29% did); Epley & 
Dunning, supra note 51, at 864 (finding that 84% of subjects predicted they would cooperate 
in a prisoner’s dilemma game, while only 61% actually cooperated); Balcetis & Dunning, 
Considering the Situation, supra note 48, at 6–11. Consider also the following questions: 
Will making a task harder reduce your performance? Will reminders help increase the 
likelihood that you will participate in a study? As a social psychologist, the obvious and 
correct answer to these is: Yes. But people think they will be awesome regardless of the 
difficulty of the task, and they think they are so on top of their schedule that they don’t need 
reminders. See Helzer & Dunning, supra note 41, at 48. 
55 This is not true across the board. Some traits are harder for others to see and some 
traits are more linked to self-image and hence more likely to be distorted in self-reports. 
Overall, for traits that are both more internal and more neutral, self-reports outperform other-
reports. Samine Vazire & Erika N. Carlson, Others Sometimes Know Us Better than We 
Know Ourselves, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 104, 104 (2011). 
56 Arthur E. Poropat, Other-Rated Personality and Academic Performance: Evidence 
and Implications, 34 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 24, 29 (2014). 
57 Yilan Xu, Andrea H. Beller, Brent W. Roberts & Jeffrey R. Brown, Personality and 
Young Adult Financial Distress, 51 J. ECON. PSYCH. 90, 92 (2015) (noting that 
conscientiousness has the strongest link to financial outcomes among the big five personality 
traits); S. Brown & K. Taylor, Household Finances and the “Big Five” Personality Traits, 
45 J. ECON. PSYCH. 197, 204 (2014) (finding that individuals high in conscientiousness have 
less unsecured debt and manage debt better). It also has a large impact on academic success. 
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dutiful, and self-disciplined.58 People who are high in conscientiousness are less 
likely to experience financial distress, and they accumulate more wealth over their 
lifetime.59 They are also less likely to miss a payment.60 This is particularly relevant 
to financial products because late fees are an important source of profits.61  
Who is the best judge of your conscientiousness? Others. Other-reports show 
twice the correlation with relevant outcomes compared to self-reports.62 Given the 
link between conscientiousness and financial outcomes, one researcher recently 
called for “financial planning tools that help make consumers aware of their lack of 
conscientiousness . . . and . . . behavioral interventions to help them overcome 
them.”63 Peer advice is a good candidate for such a reform. Others have argued that 
in the era of big data, companies might have better information about us than we 
have about ourselves.64 A loan company, for example, sees us with clearer eyes. But 
so too do our friends and family.65 They can point out times when we joined a gym 
and never went, the time when we forgot to register for classes, the times when we 
broke our diet, etc.66  
Even if others can make accurate predictions about us, we might worry that the 
process of transferring that knowledge through advice might introduce new biases 
or errors. That is, others may accurately predict your GPA or job performance when 
reporting it to a neutral third party, but the dynamic might change if they are trying 
to tell you what they predict or offering you advice rooted in that prediction. Luckily, 
 
Seth A. Wagerman & David C. Funder, Acquaintance Reports of Personality and Academic 
Achievement: A Case for Conscientiousness, 41 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 221, 221–22 (2007). 
58 Jodi C. Letkiewicz & Jonathan J. Fox, Conscientiousness, Financial Literacy, and 
Asset Accumulation of Young Adults, 48 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 274, 275 (2014). 
59 Xu et al., supra note 57, at 91. 
60 Id. at 95. 
61 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1393 n.105 (2004). 
62 Wagerman & Funder, supra note 57, at 225; see also Denis Bratko, Tomas 
Chamorro-Premuzic & Zrnka Saks, Personality and School Performance: Incremental 
Validity of Self-and Peer-Ratings over Intelligence, 41 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 131, 131 (2006) (“[P]ersonality accounted for unique variance in school 
grades: 18% by self- and 25% by peer-ratings. Self-ratings had only marginal incremental 
validity over peer-ratings in predicting school grades (3%).”). Others are also better at rating 
your intelligence, another trait with obvious implications for debt management. Vazire & 
Carlson, supra note 55, at 106; Yoav Ganzach & Moty Amar, Intelligence and the 
Repayment of High-and Low-Consequences Debt, 110 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 102, 102 (2017). 
63 Xu et al., supra note 57, at 98. 
64 See Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 2, at 95. 
65 For example, they might encourage us to set up payment reminders. You might think 
that people would do this on their own, but again, people are better social psychologists than 
self-psychologists. They accurately predict that others would benefit from reminders, but 
don’t spontaneously think they will need them. Derek J. Koehler & Connie S.K. Poon, Self-
Predictions Overweight Strength of Current Intentions, 42 J. EXPIREMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 
517, 520 (2006). 
66 They can also point out when we are suffering from confirmation bias.  
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we need not speculate. Research on advice shows that advice-giving mitigates, 
rather than introduces, various biases.  
When people advise others, they are able to filter and prioritize information in 
a way that they have trouble doing when they make decisions for themselves. In one 
study, people donated more to charities that had a physically attractive 
representative.67 But when people instead advised others on which charity to donate 
to, this beauty premium disappeared.68 Doctors report that patients often choose 
treatments based on such shallow factors as which one avoids large needles.69 When 
doctors advise patients, they appropriately discount the importance of these visceral 
factors, even though they often succumb to similar myopic overreactions when 
deciding for themselves.70  
Consider also the confirmation bias, which describes the tendency for 
individuals to seek out information that supports their preferred outcome.71 An early 
study of advice-giving found that advisors do not suffer from confirmation bias.72 
Subjects were sorted into deciders and advisors, and each subject was offered an 
opportunity to conduct research related to an everyday decision: where to go on 
vacation.73 Deciders succumbed to confirmation bias.74 They selectively ignored 
information that conflicted with their preliminary choice.75 Advisors, in contrast, 
 
67 Jason Dana & Daylian M. Cain, Advice Versus Choice, 6 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 173, 
174 (2015). 
68 Id. This more accurate filtering of information is consistent with the academic studies 
mentioned above. There, students could not ignore their aspirational test score when making 
their self-predictions, but rightly discounted such information when predicting another 
person’s score. Helzer & Dunning, supra note 41, at 49.  
69 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 66.  
70 In one study, doctors were asked to choose between two treatments for colon cancer. 
Peter A. Ubel, Andrea M. Angott & Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, Physicians Recommend 
Different Treatments for Patients than They Would Choose for Themselves, 171 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 630, 631–32 (2011). Both offered the patient an 80% chance of a complete 
cure, but they had different side effects. Id. The first treatment created a 20% chance of death. 
Id. The second treatment created a 16% chance of death and a 4% chance of other 
complications like chronic diarrhea. Id. The side effects were pretested to ensure that they 
were all overwhelmingly preferred to death. Id. The second treatment is clearly better, again, 
as long as those side effects are better than death. Id. Yet many more doctors choose the first 
treatment for themselves, while fewer choose the first treatment for their patient. Id. When 
deciding for others, these doctors were able to put their visceral feeling about things like 
intermittent bowel obstructions aside and focus on the most important feature: mortality. Id.  
71 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998). 
72 Eva Jonas & Dieter Frey, Information Search and Presentation in Advisor—Client 
Interactions, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 154, 161 (2003). 
73 Id. at 159.  
74 Id. at 160. 
75 Id. 
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conducted a balanced information search.76 This study also highlights the benefits 
of peer advice compared to expert advice. Although all advisors avoided 
confirmation bias when selecting information, subjects who played the role of a 
travel agent ignored negative information when presenting the decider with their 
recommendation.77 Friends, in contrast, presented the decider with balanced 
information that included both good and bad aspects of their recommendations.78  
A body of research adjacent to advice also supports the claim that taking on the 
role of advisor will have a debiasing effect.79 This research asks people to make 
decisions for others. This is certainly different than merely giving advice. But many 
of these studies ask people to make decisions that they simply could not make for 
others in our current social and legal climate. Should your peer get a vaccination?80 
Should they move in with their significant other?81 In these studies, it seems likely 
that subjects read this question more as: “What would I advise them to do, given that 
they will really trust my advice?” rather than, “In a dystopian world where we are 
not in control over our own most personal decisions, what would you decide for 
another person?” This body of research consistently finds that, when making 
decisions for others (as compared to deciding for oneself), people more accurately 
take probability information into account and are less likely to be affected by 
betrayal aversion, loss aversion, and omission bias.82 Further, people who have low 
 
76 Id.; see also Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hardt & Dieter Frey, Giving Advice or Making 
Decisions in Someone Else’s Place: The Influence of Impression, Defense, and Accuracy 
Motivation on the Search for New Information, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 977, 
981 (2005) (finding that advisors show less confirmation bias than those who decide for 
themselves). 
77 Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 161.  
78 Id. 
79 See, e.g., Maria Pollai & Erich Kirchler, Differences in Risk-Defusing Behavior in 
Deciding for Oneself Versus Deciding for Other People, 139 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 239 
(2012). 
80 Id. at 239. 
81 Amy H. Beisswanger, Eric R. Stone, Julie M. Hupp & Liz Allgaier, Risk Taking in 
Relationships: Differences in Deciding for Oneself Versus for a Friend, 25 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCH. 121, 134–35 (2003). 
82 See Pollai & Kirchler, supra note 79, at 243 (examining the influence of the 
probability of getting sick and vaccination decisions); Evan Polman, Self–Other Decision 
Making and Loss Aversion, 119 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 141 (2012) 
(addressing loss aversion and omission bias); Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, Brianna Sarr, Angela 
Fagerlin & Peter A. Ubel, A Matter of Perspective: Choosing for Others Differs from 
Choosing for Yourself in Making Treatment Decisions, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 618, 619–
20 (2006) (addressing betrayal aversion and finding that more people chose a vaccination for 
others than for themselves when it eliminated a 10% chance of death but added a 5% chance 
of death); cf. Christian König-Kersting & Stefan T. Trautmann, Ambiguity Attitudes in 
Decisions for Others, 146 ECON. LETTERS 126, 128 (2016) (finding no differences in 
ambiguity aversion between self and other decisions); Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hardt & 
Dieter Frey, Giving Advice or Making Decisions in Someone Else’s Place: The Influence of 
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self-esteem or high anxiety make choices for others that are not hampered by these 
traits.83 Overall, this provides further support for the powerful debiasing potential of 
giving advice.  
 
2.  Dread, Desire, and Psychological Distance 
 
Making decisions about money implicates a host of strong emotions. Wealth is 
often seen as a reflection of character. The decisions you make about money are not 
merely instrumental, they implicate your identity and self-concept. Although people 
are more motivated to make better decisions when the stakes are high (both 
financially and as a matter of self-worth), that heightened motivation often 
backfires.84  
Heightening the emotional stakes of a decision causes significant probability 
distortions. While people accurately assess probability information when 
confronting the possibility of a $20 loss or gain, they all but ignore probability when 
reacting to the possibility of an electric shock or the opportunity to kiss their favorite 
movie star.85 For those vivid outcomes, people make decisions as if there were only 
three states of the world: it won’t happen, it might happen, and it will happen.86 
Similarly, even people who routinely take probability into account when faced with 
potential monetary losses are significantly less sensitive to probability when faced 
with negative side effects from a medication.87 This selective use of probability can 
occur because negative medical and health effects trigger significantly more dread 
and anticipated regret.88  
 
Impression, Defense, and Accuracy Motivation on the Search for New Information, 31 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 977, 984 (2005) (finding a complex pattern for 
confirmation bias, where deciding for others can create a stronger confirmation bias than 
advising when subjects were told that they would have to justify their choice). 
83 Wray & Stone, supra note 13, at 125, 129–32. 
84 Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 231 
(2008). 
85 Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On 
the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCH. SCI. 185, 186–87, 189 (2001). 
86 See id. at 186; Sean Hannon Williams, Probability Errors, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 335, 346–47 (Eyal Zamir & Doron 
Teichman eds., 2014). 
87 Nathalie F. Popovic, Thorsten Pachur & Wolfgang Gaissmmaier, The Gap Between 
Medical and Monetary Choices Under Risk Persists in Decisions for Others, 32 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 388, 389 (2019) (“[I]n the medical domain compared with the monetary 
domain, people focus more on avoiding the worst outcome, largely disregarding the 
probability of the outcomes.”); Thorsten Pachur, Ralph Hertwig & Roland Wolkewitz, The 
Affect Gap in Risky Choice: Affect-Rich Outcomes Attenuate Attention to Probability 
Information, 1 DECISION 64, 64 (2014). 
88 See Popovic et al., supra note 87, at 389 (“One explanation provided for the 
discrepancy between medical and monetary decisions is the affective content of the different 
prospects: Compared with monetary outcomes, medical side effects are often associated with 
a stronger affective response.”). 
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Advisors are likely to do better. Recall that, when making decisions for others, 
people more accurately take probability into account.89 Relatedly, advisors also 
more accurately use base rates and respond more rationally to ambiguous statistical 
data.90 Advisors maintain the ability to think more clearly in part because they have 
some critical distance from the relevant outcome.  
The visceral-emotion-dampening effect of giving advice is consistent with a 
larger body of research about psychological distance.91 The phrase psychological 
distance is meant to encompass the way that people use the same set of mental tools 
to represent different types of distance, including spatial distance, temporal distance, 
and social distance.92 The general finding from this research is that people tend to 
think more abstractly about psychologically distant things and more concretely 
about psychologically near things.93 Put differently, for psychologically distant 
things, they are more likely to see the forest rather than the trees. For example, 
people are more likely to see the hidden picture within abstract art when they think 
the images are samples of a task that they will complete in the future.94 Consider 
again the following riddle: 
 
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found a rope in his 
cell that was half as long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. 
He divided the rope in half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How 
could he have done this? 
 
People are substantially more likely to solve riddles like this when they imagine that 
another person is in the tower, and that they are solving the riddle for them.95 The 
increased psychological distance between subjects and the hypothetical other person 
 
89 See Pollai & Kirchler, supra note 82; but see Popovic et al., supra note 87, at 387 
(finding similar choices for selves and others, but noting: “In contrast to our findings, most 
published studies on self‐other decision making have found differences between the two 
decision perspectives.”). 
90 Spiros Bougheas, Jeroen Nieboer & Martin Sefton, Risk-Taking in Social Settings: 
Group and Peer Effects, 92 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 273, 275 (2013) (advice and ambiguity 
aversion); see supra note 47 (discussing the evidence that people seek when making 
predictions about others). 
91 See generally Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, The Psychology of Transcending the 
Here and Now, 322 SCIENCE 1201 (2008). 
92 Id. at 1201–03. 
93 Id. at 1203. 
94 Id. 
95 Polman & Emich, supra note 14, at 496 (finding that less than half of subjects solved 
the above riddle when they imagined themselves in the tower, but two-thirds of people solved 
the riddle when they imagined another person was in the tower; the answer is that the 
prisoner splits the rope lengthwise). 
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helped them think more about the big picture aspects of the decision problem, and 
helped them think more creatively.96 Consider another riddle: 
 
A dealer in antique coins got an offer to buy a beautiful bronze coin. The 
coin had an emperor’s head on one side and the date 544 B.C. stamped on 
the other. The dealer examined the coin but instead of buying it, he called 
the police. Why?97 
 
Here too, increasing the psychological distance between the study’s subjects and the 
hypothetical dealer helped them think more creatively, and hence almost doubled 
the likelihood that they would solve the riddle.98 
The enhanced creativity of advisors, and their ability to see the bigger picture, 
are both likely to be quite useful. For example, thinking more creatively could be 
particularly helpful if the decider thinks they have no choice but to get a high-interest 
loan. Seeing the big picture could help deciders avoid mistakes like choosing a 
dialysis regime based solely on the size of the needles involved. Similarly, we might 
not pause long in considering whether your fear of offending your dentist should 
stop you from getting a second opinion about a root canal.99 The answer is “no.” 
Advisors rightly discount the importance of these momentary discomforts and are 
twice as likely to recommend a second opinion as they are to get one themselves.100 
Apparently, when deciding for themselves people are swayed by the awkwardness 
of getting the second opinion and the possibility that it would disrupt their 
relationship with their dentist.101 But when advising others they (rightly) thought it 
would be silly to get an unnecessary root canal just to avoid an awkward 
conversation.  
 
3.  Impatience and Self-Control 
 
A famous set of studies about marshmallows shows how even extremely young 
children can and do offer good advice. In those studies, researchers place a 
marshmallow in front of a child.102 Then they tell the child that if they wait and don’t 
 
96 Id. at 496–97 (finding that increasing psychological distance increases the number of 
creative solutions people spontaneously generate in the face of common challenges); id. at 
494 (finding that people draw more creative aliens when they are drawing them for someone 
else).  
97 Lile Jia, Edward R. Hirt & Samuel C. Karpen, Lessons from a Faraway Land: The 
Effect of Spatial Distance on Creative Cognition, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1127, 
1130 (2009) (providing the answer that 544 years before the birth of Christ, they did not use 
B.C. to indicate the date). 
98 Id. at 1129. 
99 Janet Schwartz, Mary Francis Luce & Dan Ariely, Are Consumers Too Trusting? The 
Effects of Relationships with Expert Advisers, 48 J. MKTG. RSCH. 163, 168–69 (2011). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 MISCHEL, supra note 8, at 3–5. 
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eat the first marshmallow, they will earn a second one.103 Three-year-olds generally 
have not developed the capacity to resist; they just immediately eat the first 
marshmallow.104 For older children, the amount of time that they are able to resist 
the temptation correlates with various outcomes later in life, like SAT scores.105 For 
our purposes, the most interesting finding of this research comes when they allow 
children to give each other advice. Three-year-olds recommend that other kids delay 
gratification to earn extra treats, even when they cannot overcome their own visceral 
desires to do so themselves.106 
Marshmallows and money have a lot in common. Across a host of domains, 
people are impatient. They are especially impatient in the near term. The prospect 
of immediate gratification exerts a strong force that causes people to exhibit steep 
discount rates in the near term and more stable discount rates in the mid and long 
term.107 In a classic example, people are perfectly happy to get $60 in 13 months as 
opposed to $50 in 12 months. That is, they are perfectly happy to “invest” their $50 
for one month and get $10 in interest—except when they can get that $50 right now. 
In that case, people take the $50. That is, they are more patient for future decisions 
than for present decisions.108 This pattern is sometimes labeled present-bias or 
hyperbolic discounting.109 The concept of psychological distance described in the 
previous section suggests that people would be more patient for both future 
decisions, and decisions for other people. This is precisely what the research finds. 
Present-bias is substantially weaker when making decisions for others.110 Like the 
three-year-olds, adult advisors will probably recommend patience.111  
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 47. 
105 Id. at 5. 
106 Id. at 49; Prencipe & Zelazo, supra note 10, at 503. 
107 Lawrence M. Spizman, The Inverted Nudge: An Application of Behavioral 
Economic Concepts to Settlement Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL ECON. 95, 98 (2018).  
108 See id. at 98–99. 
109 See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and to Be 
Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 273 (2015). 
110 Fenja V. Ziegler & Richard J. Tunney, Decisions for Others Become Less Impulsive 
the Further Away They Are on the Family Tree, 7 PUB. LIBR. SCI. ONE 49479, 49481 (2012); 
see also Jeremy Shapiro, Discounting for You Me and We: Time Preference in Groups and 
Pairs 2, 4–5 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with MIT Economics 
Department), http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/jplaces/papers [https://perma.cc/A7QL-
HBW6] (finding that women in India were less impatient when making investment decisions 
for others than for themselves). 
111 Or, more precisely, they will recommend actions that adhere to a more consistent 
discount rate rather than actions that show a significantly steeper discount rate for near-future 
payouts. Discount rates that are both steep and consistent are not necessarily errors or the 
result of bias. But when the person’s own preferences are inconsistent across time, one of 
the person’s preferences is erroneous in her own estimation. I want to watch Netflix now, 
but later I will wish that I had studied. We might say that it would be better to study. We 
could do so in part because we think that the later judgment is better informed and more 
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4.  Information Overload 
 
We just don’t have the time or bandwidth to read all of the disclosures in our 
world, including the iTunes terms of service, our new credit card’s terms, our old 
credit card’s updated terms, and the warning label on our new toaster.112 Relatedly, 
firms may seek to cause overload problems in order to sneak terms into a contract 
or bury relevant disclosures in irrelevant ones.113  
Aggregated advice can reduce overload problems by radically condensing the 
relevant information. Listing the percentage of people who would “recommend this 
product to a friend” is one example.114 Star ratings are a closely related example. 
They collapse an entire experience with a product and the business behind it into 
one 5 star satisfaction rating.115 
Less obviously, even non-aggregated advice is likely to offer benefits. People 
are more motivated to understand a topic when they are advising others.116 This 
yields a number of more specific advantages. Advisors spontaneously think of more 
relevant questions,117 they seek out more information,118 they seek out more 
balanced information,119 and they remember just as many details from what they 
 
consistent with the person’s overall set of preferences. See MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC 
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 37 (2004) (discussing the “thorny 
problem of conflicting preferences”).  
112 For a discussion of information overload, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 31, at 94–106. 
113 See id. at 23, 164, 192.  
114 For one such example, see reviews on BestBuy.com. 
115 Star ratings are more akin to disclosures than advice, but they illustrate the power of 
aggregation. See supra note 31. 
116 Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 161–63 (finding that advisor-friends were more 
motivated to make good decisions than even the decider herself, regardless of whether or not 
the friend was offered a monetary incentive to match the choice made by the decider); Jonas 
et al., supra note 76, at 982 (same); Silvia Bonaccio & Reeshad S. Dalal, Advice Taking and 
Decision-Making: An Integrative Literature Review, and Implications for the Organizational 
Sciences, 101 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 127, 134 (2006) [hereinafter 
Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making] (“[R]elative to personal decision-
makers, advisors exhibit greater concern about the accuracy of their recommendations and 
exert more task related effort.”). This may partially explain why advice is better at improving 
decisions than direct observation of the relevant facts by the decision maker. Martin Kocher, 
Matthias Sutter & Florian Wakolbinger, Social Learning in Beauty‐Contest Games, 80 S. 
ECON. J. 586, 603 (2014) (finding that pieces of advice “support higher depths of reasoning 
as they force a subject to digest the different suggestions and build their own opinion”). 
117 Laura J. Kray, Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making, 83 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 82, 91, 98, 103 (2000). 
118 Id. at 103; Vered Halamish & Nira Liberman, How Much Information to Sample 
Before Making a Decision? It’s a Matter of Psychological Distance, 71 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 113–14 (2017) (finding that people seek out about twice as much 
information when making decisions for others); Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 161. 
119 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
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read.120 Consider a credit card balance-transfer offer. Advisors will be more likely 
to read the small print, more likely to do additional research, and more likely to 
spontaneously come up with relevant questions like: “Would the promotional rate 
still apply if I miss a payment?” This mitigates overload problems and decreases the 
effectiveness of hiding unwanted terms in less salient parts of the contract.  
Other research provides further support for this. Choice overload describes the 
tendency for people to be paralyzed by large numbers of choices.121 Advisors don’t 
suffer from choice overload. Increasing the number of options tends to increase 
rather than decrease their engagement.122 Advisors also suffer less decision 
fatigue.123 Recall finally that people who suffer from high anxiety offer advice that 
is not tainted by that anxiety.124 This suggests that advisors might be able to navigate 
high stakes and numerous options better than deciders.125 
Peer advice can be useful even if firms are successful in triggering overload 
problems. Here, advice can alter our reactions to overload even if it cannot prevent 
overload in the first place. Consider an investment advisor trying to sell you a 
portfolio with high fees. They might present you with pages and pages of graphs and 
forecasts as a way to overwhelm you. Even if your friend—despite engaging in more 
thorough and accurate information processing—is equally overwhelmed, they might 
still say: “Wow, I didn’t understand any of that!” This is likely to alter reactions to 
overload by alleviating social pressure to go ahead with the transaction anyway. 
 
120 Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 164–66; see Kray, supra note 117, at 98. 
121 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687–89 (2011). In the financial context, increasing the number of 
investment options in a retirement plan generally suppresses enrollment. When there are too 
many choices, people prefer not to invest the time they think is necessary to make the choice, 
and hence don’t make any decision at all. Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman & Wei Jiang, 
How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Contributions to 401 (K) Retirement Plans, in PENSION 
DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAV. FIN. 83, 88–91 (Olivia S. Mitchell & 
Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004). 
122 Evan Polman, Effects of Self—Other Decision Making on Regulatory Focus and 
Choice Overload, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 980, 983 (2012) [hereinafter Polman, 
Effects of Self] (supporting this conclusion when deciding for others). Similarly, offering 
advisors more choices should increase their satisfaction with their advice, even though 
expanding the choice set tends to decrease the decider’s satisfaction with their choice. See 
id. 
123 See Evan Polman & Kathleen D. Vohs, Decision Fatigue, Choosing for Others, and 
Self-Construal, 7 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 471, 476 (2016) (finding that, when 
deciding for others, people who see themselves as relatively independent suffered less 
decision fatigue). 
124 Wray & Stone, supra note 13, at 125, 129–32. 
125 This does not mean advisors will always avoid overload problems. Some studies 
suggest that these problems will reappear when the advisor is told that they must justify their 
advice to a third party. See Polman, Effects of Self, supra note 122, at 987–88 (finding that, 
when deciding for others, choice overload only occurred when a third party would read their 
reported justifications for the choice). 
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Having a friend say this will make you more willing to admit that you, too, need 
more time to consider the investment.  
 
5.  Literacy, Numeracy, and Experience 
 
Although advisors will often try harder to understand and process relevant 
information, they may run into the limits of their own literacy or numeracy.126 Recall 
the parable that began this section: “[I]f the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into 
the ditch.”127 If we take this parable literally, rather than in the metaphorical sense it 
was intended, we might picture a line of people falling into a ditch one after the 
other, like dominos.128 The reality is likely to be much different.129 At the very least, 
the first blind person to fall in the ditch is likely to shout “There’s a ditch here, watch 
out!” at which point the others may well avoid falling. The leader may also be 
familiar with the terrain, in which case she can easily sidestep the ditch and guide 
others to do the same. Each case highlights the role of experience in helping 
overcome one’s inability to see certain hazards.  
Similarly, people can learn from experience regardless of their literacy or 
numeracy. Experience concretizes lessons and allows us to synthesize a huge 
quantity of information. Many scholars have wondered whether Miranda warnings 
should be simplified to make them easier to understand.130 This might help. But 
experience might well be a better teacher. It might tell you not to talk to the police. 
Advice can harness that experience. Suppose the police could not question you until 
after they read you the Miranda warnings and you called two friends to receive 
advice. What might those friends say? Probably something like: “Keep your mouth 
shut.” This suggests that we might make more rational decisions if mandatory 
disclosures were coupled with advice.  
Experience also captures unique information. The overwhelming majority of 
payday borrowers report that the relevant loan terms are fairly clear.131 But those 
terms are only the starting point to understanding the effects of the loan. People with 
experience may have specific information that borrowers could not glean from the 
contract terms, no matter how literate and numerate they were. Borrowers report that 
 
126 For a discussion of literacy and numeracy, see Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 
121, at 711–16 and BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 80–91. 
127 Matthew 15:14 (King James). 
128 This seems to be the case in Pieter Bruegel’s 1568 painting entitled The Blind 
Leading the Blind.  
129 Emily Underwood, How Blind People Use Batlike Sonar, SCIENCE (Nov. 11, 2014), 
at http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/11/how-blind-people-use-batlike-sonar [https:// 
perma.cc/48KL-FWFG].  
130 See Ferguson & Leo, supra note 11, at 938, 959–60. 
131 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA, REPORT 2: HOW 
BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 17 (2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2013/02/20/pew_choosing_borrowing_payday_feb2013-(1).pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/8KKC-PBPG] (reporting that 75–88% of borrowers thought the terms and conditions of 
payday loans were clear versus very or somewhat confusing). 
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different lenders are differentially likely to renegotiate terms once the borrower falls 
behind on payments.132 Some auto title borrowers may believe that lenders will not 
exercise their full repossession rights. In some cases, they may be right, but in others, 
lenders might repossess a car even if you only miss one payment. Local norms, or 
even tendencies personal to individual lenders, might be as important as the formal 
contract terms.  
More generally, borrowers develop rough affective responses to these loans. 
Fifty-two percent of auto title borrowers think that lenders took advantage of them, 
and thirty-three percent think that auto title loans hurt people more than they help 
them.133 Even if they cannot precisely say why, and even if they cannot precisely 
report how much money they have spent to service the loan, their overall sense of 
the loan product condenses a near-infinite set of product attributes into a gut reaction 
that can communicate important information about the borrower’s experience.  
Advice that is rooted in experience also has benefits when we turn our attention 
to advice-taking. Advice from someone who lost their car after taking out an auto 
title loan not only communicates risk information, it does so in a particularly 
effective way: through stories of real people. Studies of risk communication 
consistently show that narratives are far more effective than statistics.134 A 
disclosure might warn you that the lender has the right to repossess your car, and 
that warning may do some good. But people will be significantly more likely to pay 
attention to personal stories from the “nearly 1 in 5” borrowers who actually had 
their car repossessed.135  
 
132 STEPHEN NUÑEZ, KELSEY SCHABERG, RICHARD HENDRA, LISA SERVON, MINA 
ADDO & ANDREA MAPILLERO-COLOMINA, ONLINE PAYDAY AND INSTALLMENT LOANS: 
WHO USES THEM AND WHY? 52 (MDRC 2016), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/ 
online_payday_2016_FR.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7T4-S27U]. 
133 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AUTO TITLE LOANS: MARKET PRACTICES AND 
BORROWERS’ EXPERIENCES 15 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/03/ 
autotitleloansreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T5K-Z6YN]. 
134 John B.F. De Wit, Enny Das & Raymond Vet, What Works Best: Objective Statistics 
or a Personal Testimonial? An Assessment of the Persuasive Effects of Different Types of 
Message Evidence on Risk Perception, 27 HEALTH PSYCH. 110, 110, 113 (2008) (finding 
that narratives are more impactful than statistics at increasing risk perception); Victoria A. 
Shaffer & Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, All Stories Are Not Alike: A Purpose-, Content-, and 
Valence-Based Taxonomy of Patient Narratives in Decision Aids, 33 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 4, 4 (2013) (noting that narrative approaches to health-education are controversial 
precisely because they are thought to be too influential compared to statistics). 
135 ANN BADDOUR, JAMIE TEGELER-SAUER & DEBORAH FOWLER, TEX. APPLESEED, 
PAYDAY AND AUTO TITLE LENDING IN TEXAS 3 (2016), 
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Payday-Auto-Title-Lending-Tx_MktOv-
Trends2012-2015Rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C3B-YYYF]. Borrowers may also want to 
know the identity of those lenders who try to use the threat of criminal charges to extract 
payments. Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., 689 F. App’x 800, 802 (5th Cir. 2017) (describing 
the practice of some payday lenders who report borrowers to the local district attorney for 
writing bad checks if they default). 
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Of course, not all people will have friends with relevant experience. But there 
is a convenient relationship between how dangerous a course of action is and how 
useful advice might be. As a consumer loan product becomes more dangerous in the 
sense that it ensnares more people, for example, it is more likely that there will be 
someone who can help point out its negative potential. A similar result is likely to 
occur even if the product harms very few people, if it does a great deal of harm to 
this small group. As the magnitude of the negative effect increases, more people who 
were not directly affected are likely to take notice. Because people will seek advice 
from those who are likely to be most helpful, they will be looking for advisors who 
have direct or indirect experience.136 This makes it more likely that those seeking 
advice about a predatory loan product, a bank’s overdraft fees, a credit card’s late 
fees, or any other hidden feature of a contract will hear a relevant cautionary tale.137  
 
B.  Getting Advice: Will People Listen? 
 
There are several lines of research that explore advice-taking. Much of this 
research focuses on how to design more effective advice messages.138 
Communications scholars have developed Advice Response Theory, which teases 
out various aspects of advice that make it more effective.139 For example, they might 
examine the effect of politeness or padding advice with statements of emotional 
support.140 These scholars also examine dynamics related to gender or perceived 
trustworthiness.141 Scholars of linguistics dissect actual advice-producing 
conversations in an effort to help counselors and doctors advise their patients more 
 
136 Erina L. MacGeorge, Bo Feng & Lisa M. Guntzviller, Advice: Expanding the 
Communication Paradigm, in COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 40 213, 223 (Elisia L. Cohen 
ed., 2016) (noting that “recipients tend to select advisors they perceive to have relevant 
expertise”); Lyn M. Van Swol, Jihyun Esther Paik & Andrew Prahl, Advice Recipients: The 
Psychology of Advice Utilization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ADVICE 21, 27 (Erina L. 
MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018) (noting that advisees “are more likely to seek 
out advice from advisors who offer [advisees] information they do not know than information 
to which they have already been exposed”). Although advisees are often unable to identify 
experts, they can often identify people who are more knowledgeable than themselves. Albert 
E. Mannes, Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, The Wisdom of Select Crowds, 107 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 276, 286 (2014). 
137 Of course, it is harder to find experienced advisors in some contexts. Retirement 
may be one. Many people may not realize their mistakes until decades later. Further, some 
social barriers exist to forming the necessary intergenerational friendships that might 
promote good retirement advice. Even if a younger person is friends with people with this 
relevant experience, they may discount the advice. After all, the advisor grew up in a different 
era, with different economic conditions, etc.  
138 MacGeorge et al., supra note 136, at 214. 
139 Id. at 216. 
140 Id. at 215–16. 
141 Id. at 216. 
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effectively.142 These nuanced issues are interesting and important.143 But this Part is 
concerned with the big-picture question of whether people listen to advice at all, not 
how to tweak advice at the margins. Research within psychology offers the most 
direct assessment of this question. The bulk of this literature seeks to measure the 
extent to which people follow advice. The punchline is twofold. First, people 
incorporate advice and improve their decisions. Second, people could do better; they 
hew too much toward their initial opinion and don’t give advice the full weight that 
it deserves.  
Advice works. Numerous lab studies find that advice improves decision-
making.144 In order to show this, researchers need a way to measure how much 
influence advice has. This impacts how the studies are designed. In a common 
research design, subjects are asked to answer a set of questions with correct 
numerical answers like the dates that historical events occurred, the number of 
calories in certain foods, or the distance between two cities.145 After giving an initial 
answer, they are provided with advice about the correct answer, ostensibly from a 
peer.146 Researchers can then measure whether and how much subjects alter their 
initial responses.147 The consistent finding of numerous studies is that people take 
advice into account and use it to improve their answers.148  
Related work in economics also finds that advice is helpful. “[A]dvice is a very 
powerful force in shaping the decisions that people make and tends to push those 
decisions in the direction of the predictions of rational theory.”149 For example, in a 
study where participants had to make choices about entering a tournament, advice 
significantly improved self-sorting.150 About twice the number of strong-performing 
women entered the tournament after receiving advice, and about half as many weak-
performing men entered after they received advice.151 Advice has also been shown 
 
142 Id. at 218, 221, 227–28. 
143 For example, it is important to know whether emotional support helps people follow 
advice, and if so whether those emotional supports should come before or after. Id. at 216 
(“[A]dvice offered following emotional support and problem analysis messages is perceived 
as higher in quality, more facilitative of the recipient’s coping, and leads to stronger 
implementation intention than advice that does not follow this sequential pattern.”). 
144 Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 129–30, 
133.  
145 See id. at 138; see also Robertson, supra note 5, at 701 (using estimation of how 
much money is in a jar). 
146 Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 138. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Schotter, supra note 26, at 196 (collecting studies). 
150 Jordi Brandts, Valeska Groenert & Christina Rott, The Impact of Advice on Women’s 
and Men’s Selection into Competition, 61 MGMT. SCI. 1018, 1018 (2015).  
151 Id. at 1030–31 (using advice from another subject, but one who had gone through 
one tournament already). 
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to improve performance over and above the learning that advisees gain from 
observing what others have done.152 
If anything, these studies understate the power of advice. Three factors support 
this. First, they often use relatively low-salience outcomes like small cash payouts.153 
Second, they use anonymous advice from strangers.154 Third, and relatedly, they use 
simple written advice rather than advice that is embedded in more complex 
conversations.155  
What if the stakes were higher, either because subjects could earn more money 
or because the advice concerned courses of action that were more emotionally 
salient? In both cases, the advisee might be under a great deal more stress. Other 
psychological research shows that this will increase advice-taking. People tend to 
give greater weight to advice when the task at hand is difficult and when they are 
experiencing heightened anxiety.156 Further suggestive evidence comes from 
medical decision-making, an area where people are likely to be under a great deal of 
stress while dealing with important issues. There, patients crave advice and many 
even want their doctor to make the relevant decision for them.157 This suggests that 
people will readily take advice about important real-world decisions. The limited 
field research supports this claim. Research into corporate decision-making suggests 
that advice improves corporate performance.158 Seeking advice from those inside the 
firm helps, but seeking advice from outsiders is even more helpful.159 Advice is 
valuable for a number of reasons. Here, the researchers identified one particularly 
 
152 See Boğaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv & Andrew Schotter, An Experimental Test of 
Advice and Social Learning, 56 MGMT. SCI. 1687, 1700 (2010). 
153 See, e.g., Brandts, supra note 150, at 1023 (using undergraduates who earned an 
average of roughly 18 euros each).  
154 Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 138–39. 
155 Id. at 138; see, e.g., Brandts, supra note 150, at 1020–21. 
156 Francesca Gino & Don A. Moore, Effects of Task Difficulty on Use of Advice, 20 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 21, 21 (2007); Francesca Gino, Alison Wood Brooks & Maurice 
E. Schweitzer, Anxiety, Advice, and the Ability to Discern: Feeling Anxious Motivates 
Individuals to Seek and Use Advice, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 497, 497 (2012).  
157 Neeraj K. Arora & Colleen A. McHorney, Patient Preferences for Medical Decision 
Making: Who Really Wants to Participate?, 38 MED. CARE 335, 335–36 (2000) (reporting 
that 69% of patients wanted to leave the final decision to their doctor); John D. Lantos, Do 
Patients Want to Participate in Decisions About Their Own Medical Care?, 15 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2015) (reporting a 1984 survey that found “[e]ighty percent of the patients 
preferred to have their clinicians make the therapeutic decisions”); Mellina da Silva Terres, 
Cristiane Pizzutti dos Santos & Kenny Basso, Antecedents of the Client’s Trust in Low- 
Versus High-Consequence Decisions, 29 J. SERVS. MKTG. 26, 27 (2015) (finding that, as the 
decision becomes more impactful, people’s desire for autonomy and responsibility is reduced 
and they start experiencing the negative emotions stemming from having to choose). 
158 Philip Meissner & Torsten Wulf, Debiasing Illusion of Control in Individual 
Judgment: The Role of Internal and External Advice Seeking, 10 REV. MANAGERIAL SCI. 
245, 248 (2016). 
159 Id. at 250–51. 
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important aspect: advice can mitigate over-optimism and a manager’s tendency to 
think that they can control outcomes.160  
People are also likely to give more weight to advice from friends and family, 
compared to unsolicited advice from anonymous strangers. We might (rightly) think 
that ignoring advice from friends and family could do some damage to those social 
relationships. If so, then we might be more likely to seriously consider advice. 
People are more likely to solicit advice from friends and family than strangers, and 
people tend to follow solicited advice more than unsolicited advice.161 
Finally, friends and family can and do present advice in ways that can bolster 
its effectiveness. They do not merely write a recommendation on a post-it note and 
stick it on your car. They pair advice with emotional support (“I know this must be 
hard for you . . . .”), encouragement (“You got this!”), new questions (“Have you 
thought about . . . .”), follow-ups (“What did you decide?”), and much more. They 
may also provide reasons and arguments in favor of their advice. Research has found 
that many of these features of natural advice enhance its impact.162  
The studies above show that advice works. But we might worry about whether 
there will be a lot of noise in real-world advice. Some of it might be bad, after all, 
 
160 Id. 
161 See Lyn M. Van Swol, Jihyun Esther Paik & Andrew Prahl, Linguistic Influences 
on the Outcomes of Imposed Advice, 39 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 318, 319 (2020) 
(“[R]ecipients often react most negatively to imposed advice, probably because it threatens 
their sense of autonomy and competence. Unsolicited and unwanted advice is less likely to 
be utilized and is perceived as lower quality than solicited and wanted advice.”). Note that 
advice does not fit the neat binary of solicited or not, but rather falls on a spectrum. For 
example, telling someone about a problem might be an implicit request for advice. 
162 Kasey A. Foley, Erina L. MacGeorge, David L. Brinker, Yuwei Li & Yanmengqian 
Zhou, Health Providers’ Advising on Symptom Management for Upper Respiratory Tract 
Infections: Does Elaboration of Reasoning Influence Outcomes Relevant to Antibiotic 
Stewardship?, 39 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 349, 349 (2020) (reason-giving); Erina 
MacGeorge, Lisa M. Guntzviller, Kellie S. Brisini, Loren C. Bailey, Sara K. Salmon, 
Kaytiann Severen, Sara E. Branch, Helen M. Lillie, Cynthia K. Lindley, Rebekah G. Pastor 
& Ryan D. Cummings, The Influence of Emotional Support Quality on Advice Evaluation 
and Outcomes, 65 COMMC’N Q. 80, 80 (2017) (emotional support); Dalal & Bonaccio, supra 
note 22, at 17 (finding that statements of social support were just as important as 
recommendations in predicting whether advice was perceived as helpful); see id. at 21 
(“[D]ecision-makers appeared to want their advisors to provide information about the 
alternatives.”); Geoffrey L. Cohen & David K. Sherman, The Psychology of Change: Self-
Affirmation and Social Psychological Intervention, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 333, 340 (2014) 
(affirmations of self-worth); Steffen Altmann & Christian Traxler, Nudges at the Dentist, 72 
EUR. ECON. REV. 19, 20 (2014) (finding that reminders double the number of people who 
make dental appointments); Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis, Nikos Zourbanos, Evangelos Galanis 
& Yiannis Theodorakis, Self-Talk and Sports Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 6 PERSPS. 
PSYCH. SCI. 348, 349 (2011) (encouragement). This may be why peer advice can be just as 
useful as expert advice in some settings. Hans-Martin Von Gaudecker, How Does Household 
Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice?, 70 J. FIN. 489, 
498–99 (2015) (finding that advice from friends was just as good as expert advice at leading 
people to diversify their holdings, even for people with low numeracy). 
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and when bad advice “works” it makes matters worse. Luckily, people seem to have 
a decently good feel for separating bad advice from good advice.  
People respond sensibly to various features of the advice context. They discount 
advice based solely on a “gut feeling” unless the person is particularly 
experienced.163 Although people can and do follow bad advice,164 they also tend to 
be suspicious of it. They discount bad advice more than good advice and are quick 
to discount advice from sources that have proven to be unreliable in the past.165 Even 
three- to six-year-olds can distinguish bad advice from good.166 In a recent study of 
peer financial advice, both advice to be impatient and advice to be patient had an 
effect, but advice to be patient had a far more powerful impact.167 This again 
suggests that advisees can sensibly filter advice. Advisees also sensibly respond to 
aggregating advice. If accuracy is your goal, one of the main benefits of advice is 
that it can be aggregated. Why seek advice from one person when you can ask two 
(or three or five)? People intuitively understand that aggregating multiple pieces of 
advice can lead to better guidance.168 They don’t give multiple pieces of advice the 
full extra weight they deserve,169 but they are generally on the right track in thinking 
 
163 Stefanie C. Tzioti, Berend Wierenga & Stijn M. J. Van Osselaer, The Effect of 
Intuitive Advice Justification on Advice Taking, 27 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 66, 70–72 
(2014). 
164 Thomas Schultze, Andreas Mojzisch & Stefan Schulz-Hardt, On the Inability to 
Ignore Useless Advice: A Case for Anchoring in the Judge-Advisor-System, 64 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 170, 171 (2017) (noting that other studies have found people tend to 
put about a 20% weight on advice from people who performed very badly on previous trials). 
165 Sunita Sah, Don A. Moore & Robert J. MacCoun, Cheap Talk and Credibility: The 
Consequences of Confidence and Accuracy on Advisor Credibility and Persuasiveness, 121 
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 246, 246 (2013). 
166 Hannes Rakoczy, Christoph Ehrling, Paul L. Harris & Thomas Schultze, Young 
Children Heed Advice Selectively, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCH. 71, 74–78 (2015) 
(finding that these children revised their answers about how much food an animal needs to 
eat after receiving adult advice, and weighed that advice differently depending on whether 
the adult named the animal correctly or said in the past “I don’t know what that animal is 
called”). 
167 Nicole Senecal, Teresa Wang, Elizabeth Thompson & Joseph W. Kable, Normative 
Arguments from Experts and Peers Reduce Delay Discounting, 7 JUDGMENT & DECISION 
MAKING 566, 580 (2012). 
168 Albert E. Mannes, Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, The Wisdom of Select Crowds, 
107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 276, 287, 288 (2014) (choosing to take the average of 5 
predictions); Mandy Hütter & Fabian Ache, Seeking Advice: A Sampling Approach to Advice 
Taking, 11 J. JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 401, 408 (2016) (finding that people choose 
to look at 10 pieces of advice before making their decision).  
169 See, e.g., Ilan Yaniv & Maxim Milyavsky, Using Advice from Multiple Sources to 
Revise and Improve Judgments, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 104, 109 
(2007) (finding that there is not much difference between providing 2 pieces of advice and 
8—the former increased accuracy by 27% while the latter did so only by 33%); Thomas 
Schultze, Andreas Mojzisch & Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Groups Weight Outside Information 
Less than Individuals Do Because They Should: Response to Minson and Mueller (2012), 24 
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that multiple pieces of advice are more helpful than one.170 Again, this certainly does 
not mean people will never get or follow bad advice. They will.171 But it does suggest 
that advisees will be more impacted by good advice than bad.  
The main problem with advice is that we often miss opportunities to use it to 
its fullest potential. Most research that seeks to quantify the influence of advice finds 
that the best strategy is to weigh your initial opinion and the advisory one equally 
by averaging them.172 But only about 20 percent of people do that.173 Approximately 
40 percent of people ignore advice entirely.174 About 10 percent of people adopt the 
advice completely and ignore their opinion entirely.175 The other 30 percent tend to 
weigh both opinions, but give too much weight to their own.176  
 
PSYCH. SCI. 1371, 1371 (2013) (finding that both individuals and dyads ignore the extra 
weight that a single piece of advice from a dyad should get over and above advice generated 
by an individual). 
170 Yaniv & Milyavsky, supra note 169, at 109. 
171 Lyn M. Van Swol, Forecasting Another’s Enjoyment Versus Giving the Right 
Answer: Trust, Shared Values, Task Effects, and Confidence in Improving the Acceptance of 
Advice, 27 INT’L J. FORECASTING 103, 109, 115 (2011) (“Although decision-makers were 
more likely to accept advice from high expertise advisors, they still” accepted advice on a 
cognitively demanding math task even when they knew the advisor was from the lowest 
performing quartile during the previous round).  
172 Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, Strategies for Revising Judgment: How (and How 
Well) People Use Others’ Opinions, 35 J. EXP. PSYCH: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 
780, 786 (2009). 
173 Id. at 786–87. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. 
176 Id.; see also Rakoczy et al., supra note 166, at 81–82 and Mannes et al., supra note 
168, at 287. Overall, this pattern is called “egocentric advice discounting.” Bonaccio & 
Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 129. Of course, this label 
obscures not only the pattern in the text, but others. Not all people use advice to the same 
degree. Narcissists tend to think that advice is low quality, but they still respond to accurate 
advice. People who feel powerful discount advice, but they still give it some weight. People 
who are socially ostracized discount advice from others. Edgar E. Kausel, Satoris S. 
Culbertson, Pedro I. Leiva, Jerel E. Slaughter & Alexander T. Jackson, Too Arrogant for 
Their Own Good? Why and When Narcissists Dismiss Advice, 131 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 33, 38 (2015); Leigh Plunkett Tost, Francesca Gino & Richard P. 
Larrick, Power, Competitiveness, and Advice Taking: Why the Powerful Don’t Listen, 117 
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 53, 57 (2012); Kelly E. See, Elizabeth W. 
Morrison, Naomi B. Rothman & Jack B. Soll, The Detrimental Effects of Power on 
Confidence, Advice Taking, and Accuracy, 116 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
272, 272 (2011); Kaileigh A. Byrne, Thomas P. Tibbett, Lauren N. Laserna, Adrienne R. 
Carter-Sowell & Darrell A. Worthy, Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from 
Others During Decision Making, 29 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 409, 409 (2016); see also 
Bradford L. Barham, Jean-Paul Chavas, Dylan Fitz & Laura Schechter, Receptiveness to 
Advice, Cognitive Ability, and Technology Adoption, 149 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 239, 256–
57 (2018) (finding that advice-taking propensity can differ depending on the cognitive ability 
of the advisee). 
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Of course, there are other imperfections in advice-taking. Advisees give more 
weight to advice that aligns with their preferred course of action.177 They also 
sometimes mistake confidence for competence,178 overly discount outlier advice,179 
and can get overloaded when presented with too much information.180 This literature 
is relatively young.181 Accordingly, there is more work to be done exploring advice-
taking in more nuanced ways. For example, studying advice between spouses or 
advice within online forums may reveal unique patterns,182 the timing of advice may 
alter its effect,183 and other situational or dispositional factors may affect advice-
taking.184  
Despite these shortfalls, the literature reveals that peer advice is highly useful, 




177 See Tomasz Zaleskiewicz, Agata Gasiorowska, Katarzyna Stasiuk, Renata 
Maksymiuk & Yoram Bar-Tal, Lay Evaluation of Financial Experts: The Action Advice 
Effect and Confirmation Bias, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1476, 1476 (2016); Tomasz 
Zaleskiewicz & Agata Gasiorowska, Evaluating Experts May Serve Psychological Needs: 
Self-Esteem, Bias Blind Spot, and Processing Fluency Explain Confirmation Effect in 
Assessing Financial Advisors’ Authority, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: APPLIED 2 (2020), 
Advance online publication, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xap0000308 [https://perma.cc/Q5CL-
3W3P] (“[D]ecision-makers, when evaluating the financial expertise of prospective advisors, 
are vulnerable to preferring advice that is consistent, as opposed to inconsistent, with their 
own beliefs.”).  
178 Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 132. 
179 Id. at 131.  
180 Foley et al., supra note 162, at 367. 
181 Erina L. MacGeorge, Communicating Advice: Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 
J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 287, 288 (2020) (noting that much of the literature is only 
twenty years old); see Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 
116, at 128 (noting that this paper, in 2006, was the first to survey the field).  
182 MacGeorge, supra note 181, at 289 (identifying these as promising areas of future 
research).  
183 See generally Christina A. Rader, Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, Pushing Away 
from Representative Advice: Advice Taking, Anchoring, and Adjustment, 130 ORG. BEHAV. 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 26 (2015) (comparing the effects of opinion formation before 
receiving advice with receiving advice before opinion formation). 
184 See Soll & Larrick, supra note 172. 
185 How could you ensure that you use advice to its fullest potential? Put on a blindfold. 
Suppose you have to estimate the number of calories in a particular meal. You’ll be much 
more accurate if you put on a blindfold and ask others to give you estimates. Then you’ll 
have no choice but to average the guesses. If you peek, you’ll make your own estimate, and 
you’re likely to give it far too much weight. See, e.g., Ilan Yaniv & Shoham Choshen‐Hillel, 
Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces 
Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 427, 428–31 (2012).  
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C.  Summary 
 
Advice works. The literature on advice-taking consistently finds that advice 
improves decision-making, even in situations where advice should be at its weakest: 
anonymous advice from a stranger whose credibility you cannot assess. Peer advice 
in the real world is likely to be more impactful. 
This impact is likely to be highly positive. Advisors are likely to recommend 
significantly better decisions than they or the advisee would otherwise make. 
“Better” is often relatively easy to define. Normatively, it is better to take probability 
into account in risky decisions than to ignore it. It is better to take relevant 
information into account rather than systematically ignore it when it conflicts with 
your intuitive choice.186 Taking on the role of an advisor may also affect decision-
making in ways that have more ambiguous welfare effects,187 and of course, more 
 
186 Of course, it is possible to construct a hypothetical person who is so haunted by 
anticipated regret and doubt in the face of options that it would be better for them to take the 
first mortgage offer they receive even if it means spending hundreds of thousands of dollars 
more over the term of the loan. For an overview of the much milder real-world version of 
this, see generally Arne Roets, Barry Schwartz & Yanjun Guan, The Tyranny of Choice: A 
Cross-Cultural Investigation of Maximizing-Satisficing Effects on Well-Being, 7 JUDGMENT 
& DECISION MAKING 689 (2012). 
187 There are some situations where it is harder, but still possible, to say that the 
advisor’s recommendation is better than the choice the decider is likely to make without 
advice. Consider preferences surrounding risk. It is perfectly rational to have low or high risk 
aversion. It’s just a matter of taste. Although there is no research on how risk preferences 
change when people offer advice, there is research on risk preferences when people make 
decisions for others. It turns out that decisions for others and decisions for oneself treat risk 
differently. When deciding for others, people tend to be more risk averse when the decision 
implicates physical safety, more risk-seeking for romantic decisions, and more risk neutral 
for monetary decisions. See Sujoy Chakravarty, Glenn W. Harrison, Ernan E. Haruvy & E. 
Elisabet Rutström, Are You Risk Averse over Other People’s Money?, 77 S. ECON. J. 901, 
911 (2011) (money); Evan Polman & Kaiyang Wu, Decision Making for Others Involving 
Risk: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 77 J. ECON. PSYCH. 102184, 3 (2020) (collecting studies 
on romantic choices and safety choices). There are three interpretations for this pattern that 
offer reasons to think that decisions for others are better. The first is that visceral emotions 
distort risk preferences, and decisions for others involve fewer of such distortions. Id. at 3 
(describing the “risk as feeling” explanation). The second interpretation of these findings is 
that, when deciding for others, people make choices that are more influenced by social 
norms. Id. Social norms might dictate that it is better to take a chance and ask someone out 
on a date, even though you might get rejected. Social norms might say that risking death is 
rarely if ever worth it, and that risk neutrality is the best way to build wealth. Decisions for 
others (and perhaps advice) will be better only when the relevant social norms align with 
one’s normative judgment about which decisions are better. A third interpretation of this 
pattern in risk preferences is that, when deciding for others, people use their own ideal self 
as a guide. See Jennifer L. Howell, Kate Sweeny & James A. Shepperd, Psychological 
Distance and the Discrepancy Between Recommendations and Actions, 36 BASIC & APP. 
SOC. PSYCH. 502, 503 (2014) (finding that “people lean toward recommendations for others 
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research is needed. This future research might reveal more nuanced patterns,188 and 
should test advice in more real-world settings. Regardless, the overall picture, 
although necessarily preliminary, is incredibly promising.  
 
that match their perception of ideal behavior”) (citations omitted). There is an interesting 
convergence in the research. Decisions for others, decisions for your future self, and 
statements about what your ideal self would do all appear to align. Eric R. Stone & Liz 
Allgaier, A Social Values Analysis of Self–Other Differences in Decision Making Involving 
Risk, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 114, 119 (2008); Emily Pronin, Christopher Y. 
Olivola & Kathleen A. Kennedy, Doing unto Future Selves as You Would Do unto Others: 
Psychological Distance and Decision Making, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 224, 
224 (2008); Polman & Emich, supra note 14, at 493; Eric R. Stone, YoonSun Choi, Wändi 
Bruine de Bruin & David R. Mandel, I Can Take the Risk, but You Should Be Safe: Self-
Other Differences in Situations Involving Physical Safety, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 
250, 252–55 (2013). This suggests that advisors are recommending actions that they 
themselves judge to be better. This is not a guarantee that they are better by whatever 
yardstick the policymaker prefers, but it is at least suggestive. It aligns with the view that 
welfare should be measured by the satisfaction of ideal preferences rather than actual (and 
often fleeting) ones. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 111, at 38.  
There are some situations where it is very difficult to say which decision is better. 
Consider non-risky choices: People weigh aspects of a decision differently depending on 
whether they are deciding for themselves or for others. For example, when deciding on which 
restaurant to go to, you might consider both the quality of the food and how far away it is. 
When deciding for others, people might place extra weight on food quality, and less weight 
on distance. Jingyi Lu, Xiaofei Xie & Jingzhe Xu, Desirability or Feasibility: Self–Other 
Decision-Making Differences, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 144, 146–48 (2013). 
It’s not clear which weighting is better. Here, I only make a weak claim: that advice in this 
context will not be welfare reducing precisely because we cannot say with confidence that 
one decision is better than the other. If advice is harmless in some areas, and highly useful 
in others, it is still quite useful overall. It may also be possible to tailor interventions such 
that policymakers promote advice only in situations where its welfare effects are clearest 
(and large and positive), and not when they are more ambiguous. 
188 For example, more work could be done to tease out how and whether a potential 
advisor’s personality traits affect their advice. For some examples of this type of research in 
the adjacent field of deciding for others, see Polman & Vohs, supra note 123, at 475 (finding 
that people who differ on a scale of independence/interdependence feel differently about 
making decisions for others); Polman & Wu, supra note 187, at 13, 16 (noting that different 
groups of people use different strategies when deciding for others). Future research should 
also explore more dynamic advice situations, where people give and get advice from one 
another multiple times. Fabian Ache, Christina Rader & Mandy Hütter, Advisors Want Their 
Advice to Be Used–But Not Too Much: An Interpersonal Perspective on Advice Taking, 89 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 13 (2020) (finding that, for difficult tasks where advisors 
lack confidence in the accuracy of their advice, advisors don’t want their opinions weighed 
heavily and are less willing to give advice in the future when they are); Hayley Blunden & 
Francesca Gino, How the Other Half Thinks: The Psychology of Advising, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ADVICE 43, 52 (Erina L. MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018) (“When 
individuals are asked for advice, it causes them to feel powerful, and when individuals feel 
powerful, they are likely to enact scripts related to having power.”); Queen et al., supra note 
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Advice-giving is a powerful and as-yet-unrecognized debiasing tool. The 
psychological distance between advisors and advisees allows advisors to see the big 
picture, avoid distorting emotions, and give advice that is untainted by hyperbolic 
discounting, betrayal aversion, omission bias, and attribution errors. Advisors try 
harder, more -rationally invest in searching for and processing information, and are 
less susceptible to overload effects. Even advisors without the necessary literacy or 
numeracy to understand contracts or government disclosures will often have 
something more valuable: concrete experience. Overall, people who take the 
perspective of the advisor are not blind, and they can offer valuable guidance to 
those of us who are. 
 
III.  PROMOTING ADVICE 
 
At this point, a skeptic may ask: “If advice is so useful, why do you think that 
people are currently underutilizing it?” There are reasons to doubt that people seek 
advice as often as they should. First, people don’t have as many friends as they used 
to. Second, people seem especially disinclined to talk about money. These barriers 
have to be overcome in order for advice to fulfill its full promise. 
We just don’t have as many close friends today as we used to. Thirty-five years 
ago, only about 10 percent of the population indicated that they had no one that they 
talked to about important matters.189 As of 2004, that number had gone up to 25 
percent.190 These numbers are even starker when we exclude family. More than half 
of Americans have no non-family members to talk to about important matters: no 
coworkers; no neighbors; no friends.191 Others have identified those with no 
confidants or only one confidant as having “inadequate counseling support.”192 
Almost half of Americans fell into this category in 2004.193 A more recent study in 
2009 found similar results.194  
 
29, at 386 (“[M]ost everyday and more consequential decisions occur over weeks and 
months, and understanding how couples move in and out of dyadic processes would help to 
address when intimate partners can be most helpful.”). Age may also be relevant to advice-
giving or advice-taking. Fabio Del Missier, Timo Mäntylä & Lars-Göran Nilsson, Aging, 
Memory, and Decision-Making, in AGING AND DECISION MAKING: EMPIRICAL AND APPLIED 
PERSPECTIVES 127, 141 (Thomas Hess, JoNell Strough & Corinna E. Löckenhoff eds., 2015) 
(noting that “aging is associated with many changes in memory processes, which can 
influence judgment and decision making in complex ways”). 
189 Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & Matthew E. Brashears, Social Isolation in 
America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks over Two Decades, 71 AM. SOCIO. REV. 
353, 358 (2006). 
190 Id. 
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 371. 
193 Id. 
194 Keith N. Hampton, Lauren F. Sessions, Eun Ja Her & Lee Rainie, Social Isolation 
and New Technology: How the Internet and Mobile Phones Impact Americans’ Social 
Networks, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 19–21 (2009) (finding that although 
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Even among people with plenty of available friends and family, some topics 
are hard to talk about. Money often tops the list of difficult things to talk about, 
beating out death, religion, and politics.195 Pause a moment and ask yourself the 
following questions: How much money does your best friend make? How much was 
his or her house? How much have they saved for retirement? I doubt many of us 
know the answers to these questions. (Unless of course, you are a law student, in 
which case the answers are likely to be zero, not applicable, and zero. But other 
information is sensitive. Do you know your best friend’s GPA, student loan amount, 
or her loan’s interest rate?) Because money is often seen as a proxy for power, 
happiness, and personal efficacy, talking about money can bring up all sorts of 
insecurities and jealousies, and may threaten the implied equality in friendships.196 
Although millennials might be more willing to discuss money compared to previous 
generations, it’s a sensitive subject for everyone.197  
Given these barriers to advice-seeking,198 actively promoting advice might 
substantially increase its use. A full cost benefit analysis of when and how to 
promote advice is beyond the scope of this Article, in part because more research 
would be needed to do so. The advice literature itself is still growing, and will benefit 
from studies that examine its general patterns in more nuanced ways.199 More 
importantly, now that the potential of peer advice is clear, researchers should turn to 
examining how advice might interact with other tools for promoting welfare, such 
as mandated disclosures and nudges. Advice alone is no panacea. In some 
circumstances, advisors might need mandated disclosure in order to generate good 
advice.200 It is possible that mandated disclosures should be designed differently if 
they are targeting both a decider and an advice-giver. Advice may also interact with 
 
just 12% of the population had no confidant in 2008, 47% had one or fewer confidants, 
consistent with the 2004 study). Of course, this does not mean that people are hermits. Only 
about 5% of people have no friends that they talk to weekly. Hu Wang & Barry Wellman, 
Social Connectivity in America: Changes in Adult Friendship Network Size from 2002 to 
2007, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1148, 1155 (2010). But when it comes to getting advice 
about life’s big decisions, data on closer friendships is probably more relevant. 
195 Chris Taylor, The Last Taboo: Why Nobody Talks About Money, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 
2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-money-conversation/the-last-taboo-why-nobody-
talks-about-money-idUSBREA2Q1UN20140327 [https://perma.cc/M6LS-22T9]. 
196 See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 633, 646 (2007) 
(discussing equality norms among friends). 
197 Dan Kadlec, Is It Rude to Talk About Money? Millennials Don’t Think So, MONEY 
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://money.com/millennials-money-manners/ [https://perma.cc/NL4B-
SAWS]. 
198 There may also be barriers to advice-giving and ways to promote it, but this Part 
focuses predominately on advice-seeking. It does so in part because unsolicited advice is 
often less effective than solicited advice. See Van Swol et al., supra note 161, at 319. 
199 See supra notes 137–87 and accompanying text. 
200 For a discussion of why sophisticated intermediators might not need mandated 
disclosure, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 185–88. 
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classic nudges.201 Advice is likely to strengthen the impact of social norms nudges.202 
But it may work against the power of default rules.203 Advice may also interact with 
other biases or psychological tendencies.204 Again, more research is needed before 
designing specific policies. Nonetheless, the power of advice highlights the 
productive potential of this research and the desirability of offering at least a 
preliminary sketch of how policymakers could tap into peer advice.  
This Part sketches several broad ways of promoting advice: (a) advising people 
to seek advice; (b) advising them to simulate advice by, for example, asking them to 
ask themselves what their spouse might say about the relevant decision; (c) 
mandating that consumers have the opportunity to seek advice; (d) incentivizing 
advice; (e) mandating advice; and (f) facilitating norms conducive to advice. This 
Part also examines ways that advice, or the opportunity to receive it, could serve as 
an input, rather than an output, of law.205 
 
201 Under Thaler and Sunstein’s capacious definition of a nudge, advice is a nudge. 
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6 (“A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of 
the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”). As this Article suggests, 
it is useful to analyze advice on its own, and it is useful to ask how it might interact with 
well-known nudges like setting welfare-enhancing default rules and informing people about 
how other people behave.  
202 See supra note 187 (discussing the ways that advice can reflect social norms). For 
examples of social norms nudges, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 66–70. 
203 Recall that advisors appear to be less susceptible to overload and decision fatigue. 
See Polman & Vohs, supra note 123, at 475–76. Accordingly, advisors might be less 
influenced by default rules. It is possible that the advisor’s degree of effort will land in an 
ironic sweet spot: it will be sufficient for them to resist the pull of the default rule, but not 
sufficient to make an informed decision. No clear prediction can be made given the state of 
the current research. For examples of default rules as nudges, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 1, at 110–17, 179–81.  
204 For example, a large literature on peer effects examines when and how your choices 
are influenced by the choices of others. Conversations that include advice may also include 
information about the advisor’s choices and this may interact with the advice given. See, e.g., 
Leonardo Bursztyn, Florian Ederer, Bruno Ferman & Noam Yuchtman, Understanding 
Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Financial 
Decisions, 82 ECONOMETRICA 1273, 1273 (2014) (finding evidence of learning from others’ 
choices, and evidence of a desire to “keep up with the Joneses”); see also Daniel A. Effron 
& Dale T. Miller, Do as I Say, Not as I’ve Done: Suffering for a Misdeed Reduces the 
Hypocrisy of Advising Others Against It, 131 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
16, 16–17 (2015) (finding that people don’t listen to advice from those who don’t practice 
what they preach, unless those advisors have suffered for their misdeeds). This is again a 
fertile area for further research. 
205 Each of the discussions in this Part largely brackets dynamic effects. Consider three 
examples. First, advising people to seek advice in situations X and Y might make people less 
likely to do so in situation Z, after all the government did not see fit to tell them that advice 
would be useful in situation Z. Second, giving incentives to seek advice might create 
something like a crowding-out effect, where people stop seeking unincentivised advice. 
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A.  Advice to Seek Advice 
 
Certain financial products, contracts, or informed consent forms in the medical 
context could carry a mandated disclosure that read: “Research suggests that seeking 
advice from friends and family about these decisions can be helpful. We encourage 
you to seek advice.” Various laws already embrace similar disclosures. While most 
of these laws advise people to seek expert advice,206 some also recommend peer 
advice. For example, Washington State recommends that people considering a 
payday loan first “[t]alk to a friend or family member about borrowing money.”207  
Personalizing the timing, phrasing, and format of these messages might 
increase the likelihood that someone will actually read them. Adjusting those 
features—perhaps especially the way the advice is phrased—could also adjust the 
strength of the nudge toward seeking advice. People are likely to react more strongly 
to messages that say “Only an idiot would do this without seeking advice first!” than 
to a more emotionless promotion of advice.  
Advice to seek advice could do some good even if consumers won’t read it. A 
disclosure that advises someone to seek advice provides a signal to sophisticated 
intermediaries that peer advice might be useful.208 Those intermediates, who 
 
Third, if people embrace advice enthusiastically, they might begin to make many decisions 
as part of a group. That is, they might conduct conference calls to decide whether to buy a 
house, and when and where to do so. If this occurs, group decision-making dynamics will 
come into play and potentially alter the patterns described in Part II. These and other dynamic 
effects will be important to study. This Part, however, is intended only as a preliminary 
catalog of possibilities. More research would be needed to evaluate the benefits of each 
within any given situation.  
206 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(E) (requiring people waiving rights under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act to be advised to seek an attorney before doing so); United 
States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring judges to say something 
substantially similar to the following: “I must advise you that in my opinion you would be 
far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of 
you to try to represent yourself . . . . I would strongly urge you not to try to represent 
yourself.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (2020) (stating that prenups are not enforceable unless 
the fiancés have been advised to consult an attorney); Voluntary Acknowledgement of 
Paternity Form, MASS., http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/cse/parents/voluntary-ack-of-
parentage-form.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPE6-PHFR] (“If you have any questions about the 
legal consequences of signing the form, consult an attorney before signing.”); MODEL RULES 
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer shall not enter into a 
business transaction with a client . . . unless . . . the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent legal counsel on the transaction . . . .”). 
207 Consumers Guide to Payday Loans in Washington State, WASH. DEP’T FIN. INSTS., 
https://dfi.wa.gov/financial-education/information/payday-loans [https://perma.cc/N5TU-
PCLN] (last visited Nov. 16, 2020). Of course, advice may have been a secondary concern 
here. Washington might instead have focused on the possibility that friends or family 
members could loan you the money at less cost.  
208 For a discussion of the role of intermediaries, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 31, at 190. 
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consumers may turn to before they make the relevant decisions, might then reinforce 
the usefulness of advice. For example, if such advice were included in mortgage 
documents, it might make its way onto Zillow.com. Once there, consumers are far 
more likely to read it.  
Advice to seek advice also has a self-advertising feature. Suppose one person 
in one hundred reads any particular disclosure and pays attention to it. For many 
mandated disclosures, this might mean that one person in one hundred will benefit. 
But in the case of advice to seek advice, that one person may contact at least one 
other person to seek their advice. That act itself becomes a tool to make advice-
seeking more common and to strengthen advice-seeking norms.  
Regardless of whether consumers learn of the advice to seek advice directly or 
indirectly, it can do some good. Most obviously, if they read it, they might seek 
advice. And if they do, they will seek out people who have experience with the 
relevant product or other relevant knowledge.209 Perhaps surprisingly, even short 
discussions with equally inexpert peers can improve decision-making by giving 
people more opportunities to process information and evaluate various arguments.210 
 
B.  Advice to Simulate Advice: WWJD 
 
Policymakers could harness some of the power of advice simply by asking 
people to consider how another person might advise them. Simply asking “What 
would your spouse say about this?” or even “What would your best friend do?” alters 
the way people think about the decision at hand.211 To take a particularly cute 
example, children are better at avoiding tempting distractions and show greater 
executive control when they think about what Batman would do,212 or even when 
 
209 MacGeorge et al., supra note 136, at 223.  
210 Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim, Fulya Ersoy & Donna Harris, Peer Advice 
on Financial Decisions: A Case of the Blind Leading the Blind? 3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. W25034, 2018) (“After communicating with a peer, subjects make 
private decisions involving both the interest bearing [financial] assets they discussed, as well 
as assets they have not previously encountered. We find that peer-communication improves 
the quality of subjects’ decisions in both cases . . . .”); id. at 4 (finding that “people in the 
bottom half of the financial competence distribution experience greater improvements when 
interacting with others in the bottom half than when interacting with others in the top half”). 
211 Note, the benefits of simulating advice are not dependent on accurate simulations. 
The consumer may wrongly predict what their friend would say. Regardless, simulating 
advice changes the way people think about their problems, and this is the benefit that 
simulating advice provides. Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel & Nicolas Epley, Perspective Mistaking: 
Accurately Understanding the Mind of Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking 
Perspective, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 547, 547 (2018) (noting that taking 
another’s perspective does not make one an accurate judge of their perspective). 
212 Rachel E. White, Emily O. Prager, Catherine Schaefer, Ethan Kross & Angela L. 
Duckworth, The “Batman Effect”: Improving Perseverance in Young Children, 88 CHILD 
DEV. 1563, 1564 (2017). The effect also works with other characters like Dora, Rapunzel, or 
Bob the Builder. Id. at 1566. 
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they just wear a Superman cape.213 Taking the perspective of another person also 
improves reasoning skills by making people more objective,214 more creative 
problem solvers,215 and better able to exercise self-control.216 Once you have a 
picture in your head of what your spouse might say, or what your best friend would 
do, it likely operates as a form of simulated advice. If someone believes that their 
best friend would not get the extended service warranty and would advise against it, 
they are probably less likely to get it themselves.217 Similar insights may be behind 
the “What would Jesus do?”(WWJD) movement and its goal of improving moral 
reasoning and self-control.218 
Priming people to think about what advice they might receive will also prime 
them to feel watched, which in turn increases the salience of social norms.219 As 
applied to the choice of whether to see a doctor, asking “What would Jane do?” 
would likely amplify the effect of norms like “better safe than sorry.” For example, 
people might think that Jane would set aside her embarrassment at her potential 
medical condition and work through the annoyance of finding an in-network doctor. 
These thoughts could increase the pressure on the potential patient to comply with 
relevant norms, which would likely improve decision-making.220  
 
213 Id. Rachel Karnoid, Lior Galili, Dafna Shtilerman, Reut Naim, Karin Stern, Hadar 
Manjoch & Rotem Silverman, Why Superman Can Wait: Cognitive Self-Transformation in 
the Delay of Gratification Paradigm, 40 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 307, 310 
(2011) (finding that children delayed gratification more when wearing the cape).  
214 See Ethan Kross & Igor Grossmann, Boosting Wisdom: Distance from the Self 
Enhances Wise Reasoning, Attitudes, and Behavior, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 43, 45 
(2012). 
215 Polman & Emich, supra note 14, at 494–95. 
216 White et al., supra note 212, at 1563. 
217 Tao Chen, Ajay Karla & Baohong Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Service 
Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 611, 611 (2009) (noting the extended warranties are of 
little value to consumers, but represent about 50% of Best Buy’s profit); THALER & 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 80–82 (using extended warranties as a quintessential example of 
a useless product that is only successful because of consumer biases).  
218 Karl Smallwood, The Fascinating Story of How the “What Would Jesus Do?” 
Slogan Came About, TODAY I FOUND OUT (June 6, 2014), http://www.todayifoundout.com/ 
index.php/2014/06/origin-jesus-slogan/ [https://perma.cc/RZA4-SAKW]. 
219 Universities can increase handwashing by approximately 15% just by adding a 
cartoon picture of eyes above a sign that, in text, promotes hand washing. Stefan Pfattheicher, 
Christoph Strauch, Svenja Diefenbacher & Robert Schnuerch, A Field Study on Watching 
Eyes and Hand Hygiene Compliance in a Public Restroom, 48 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 188, 
190 (2018). Political parties can increase turnout by about 1% by adding eyes to postcards 
that otherwise ask people to vote. Richard E. Matland & Gregg R. Murray, I Only Have Eyes 
for You: Does Implicit Social Pressure Increase Voter Turnout?, 37 POL. PSYCH. 533, 533–
36 (2016) (noting mixed results overall for this strategy). More generally, watchful eyes tend 
to increase compliance with norms. Ryo Oda, Yuta Kato & Kai Hiraishi, The Watching-Eye 
Effect on Prosocial Lying, 13 EVOUTIONARY PSYCH. 1, 1 (2015). 
220 Of course, in some social situations, the norms may promote poor decisions. If this 
is the case, then asking “What would Jane do?” will likely encourage worse decisions.  
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Simulating the act of giving advice will likely have some of the same benefits 
as simulating the act of receiving advice. If you want people to get a flu shot, you 
might ask them to ask themselves “Should I get a flu shot?” That might help. But 
you could also ask them: “Should your friend get the flu shot?” or “What would you 
advise your friend to do?”221 As discussed above, being put into the role of advice 
giver carries a host of debiasing benefits.222 Once people decide that their friend 
should get a flu shot, it will be more likely that they will follow their own advice.223  
 
C.  Mandating Opportunities to Seek Advice 
 
Certain financial products could require that consumers have the opportunity to 
seek advice before entering the transaction. Some laws already adopt this strategy.224 
Other areas of law embrace waiting periods or cooling off periods. Ten states 
mandate cooling off periods between payday loans.225 Under these laws, borrowers 
who have just gotten out from under one payday loan must wait between 2 and 45 
days to obtain another.226 The shorter periods offer a chance to reflect; the longer 
periods force potential borrowers to figure out alternate ways of dealing with their 
monetary shortfall. Waiting periods and cooling off periods can also facilitate 
advice, and this is another reason to support them. For example, pawnshops might 
be required to undo the transaction if the customer returns the loaned money within 
some time limit. The idea here might be that, once the customer goes home and tells 
his spouse about the transaction, that spouse may advise (perhaps strongly) that he 
undo it. This is precisely what Washington State does in the context of payday loans. 
Borrowers have one day to undo the loan.227 This type of cooling off period can 
facilitate reflection and also advice.  
 
221 Frederick Chen & Ryan Stevens, Applying Lessons from Behavioral Economics to 
Increase Flu Vaccination Rates, 32 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 1067, 1070 (2017) 
(suggesting that this could increase flu vaccination rates). Other researchers have suggested 
that people could improve their understanding of their own personality traits if they judged 
them while taking another’s perspective. Vazire & Carlson, supra note 55, at 107. 
222 See supra Part II.A. 
223 In this way, advice-giving may benefit both the advisee and the advisor.  
224 Many states consider when the prenup was presented to determine whether to 
enforce it. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 352 (N.H. 2003). This is relevant 
in part because courts want fiancés to have the opportunity to seek independent advice. Id.  
225 Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 
54,472, 54,478 (Nov. 17, 2017). 
226 Virginia has a 45 day cooling off period after an extended time of indebtedness. Id. 
at 54,485. Virginia also requires a 1 day cooling off period before getting a subsequent pay 
day loan. Supplemental Findings on Payday, Payday Installment, and Vehicle Title Loans, 
and Deposit Advance Products, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0025 (June 16, 2016). Illinois 
requires cooling off periods between payday loans of at least 7 days, depending on the 
circumstances. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5 (2020).  
227 Payday Lending–—Borrower Rights and Responsibilities, WASH. DEPT. OF FIN. 
INST. (Dec. 28, 2009) https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/consumer/payday-brochure.pdf 
 
424 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
Even micro-waiting periods have the potential to assist borrowers. For 
example, payday loans might be required to insert a five-minute wait before 
beginning the paperwork, during which they must disclose that the relevant 
government entity recommends that they call a friend and seek advice. This micro-
waiting period could have two effects. First, it creates a pause that makes it more 
likely that consumers will read or hear a relevant disclosure and actually think about 
it for a moment. Second, because seeking advice could be as easy and quick as a 
phone call or text, even a short pause could create sufficient space.  
These micro-waiting periods would be particularly easy to implement in the 
increasingly common online sector of the small loan industry. Online lending 
emerged in the 2000s and is the “fastest growing component” of the small-dollar 
subprime market.228 While physical store revenue has been declining, online revenue 
has been increasing, with $11 billion in loan volume as of 2012.229 In the process of 
applying online, it would be easy to mandate and monitor compliance with a micro-
waiting period. The relevant sites could be required to show a screen with the 
standardized warnings along with advice to seek advice. That screen could also have 
a countdown to move on with the transaction, much like you can skip ads on 
YouTube, but only after a certain amount of time has passed.  
The emerging market for app-based loans provides additional opportunities to 
implement creative micro-waiting periods. App-based loans provide unique 
opportunities because those apps could be integrated with other apps on a 
smartphone. The micro-waiting period could specifically recommend, or even open 
by default, a messaging or texting app. One might even imagine Facebook 
integrations where the app predicts the identity of your closest friend and suggests 
that you message them.  
In some cases, firms might have sufficient control over the transaction that they 
can effectively minimize the opportunity or prevent the consumer from seeking 




[https://perma.cc/WPG6-9P67]; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167E, § 7(d)(2) (2020) 
(“[A]n applicant for the [reverse mortgage] loan shall not be bound for 7 days after his 
acceptance, in writing, of the lender’s written commitment to make the loan.”). 
228 NUÑEZ ET AL., supra note 132, at 4. 
229 Id. Lenders may have shifted to online loans in part to avoid potential regulation of 
traditional payday loans.  
230 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 
1174 (2013); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails 
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1638 (2014) (“Mandating new forms of disclosure is 
unlikely to significantly improve outcomes when . . . firms have strong incentives to 
undermine choice in response to the required disclosures.”); Jacob Hale Russell, The 
Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft 
Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 36 (2015) (noting that proponents of “nudges 
rarely consider the ability of third parties to counter-nudge or to weaken nudge outcomes”). 
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D.  Incentivizing Advice 
 
Just as governments use tax breaks, subsidies, and various penalties to shape 
behavior, they could also create incentives to promote advice-seeking.231 In the 
financial context, one could imagine a required nominal charge on payday loans that 
is waived if you make a phone call while you wait. Some people may just pretend 
to call someone to ask about advice. So be it. But others might actually do so. A 
much stronger regulation might allow fee waivers only if the advisor signed the 
relevant loan contract.232 Regardless, the nominal fee provides the borrower with an 
incentive to seek advice. Larger loans, like mortgages, might justify larger incentives 
and more stringent requirements for waiving the relevant fee.233  
Similar incentives might work in the medical and educational contexts as well. 
If potential law students are overly optimistic about their future 1L performance and 
employment prospects, then incentivizing them to seek advice from current students 
or alum might be helpful. Elective medical procedures like Lasik, teeth whitening, 
and cosmetic surgery could include fees that are waived if you seek advice. This 
could help people better understand the everyday hedonic impact (or lack thereof) 
of those procedures.234  
Incentivizing advice could be particularly useful for people who associate a 
stigma with advice-seeking. Some people want to ask for advice, but may fear that 
 
231 Those incentives could be framed as avoiding losses or realizing gains. Because 
lenders might have the capacity to reframe any proposed governmental frame, this section 
will not make much of the potential differences between these frames. 
232 One could imagine that consumers would get annoyed every time they take out this 
payday loan, because they are never able to get someone else to sign it or to answer their 
phone at the particular time that they were seeking the loan. But that annoyance might make 
the government message—you should seek advice—all the more memorable even if it’s not 
always achievable in practice. 
233 Incentives could also influence the lender’s behavior. States that regulate lending 
could loosen those regulations if the lender promotes advice-seeking. For example, a city 
that requires a “Predatory Lender” warning sign might waive that requirement if the lender 
has certain procedures that promote advice-seeking. Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: 
Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 893, 893 (2012) (proposing a similar warning). Alternatively, lenders might 
be subject to different usury laws depending on their general advice-promoting policies or 
whether an advice-giver signed off on a particular loan. Of course, these could be 
personalized to apply differently to different lenders, different consumers, or different 
combinations of lender and consumer.  
234 Claire E. Ashton-James & Axel Chemke-Dreyfus, Can Orthognathic Surgery Be 
Expected to Improve Patients’ Psychological Well-Being? The Challenge of Hedonic 
Adaptation, 127 EUR. J. ORAL SCI. 189, 190 (2019) (“[S]ystematic reviews conclude that the 
effects of elective cosmetic surgery are not enduring.”); Kaoru Tounaka-Fujii, Kenya Yuki, 
Kazuno Negishi, Ikuko Toda, Takayuki Abe, Keisuke Kouyama & Kazuo Tsubota, Effects 
of Laser in Situ Keratomileusis on Mental Health-Related Quality of Life, 10 CLINICAL 
OPHTHALMOLOGY 1859, 1862 (2016) (“Surprisingly, no significant improvement was 
observed in [health-related quality of life] after 6 months of LASIK.”). 
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there is some stigma attached to doing so.235 Monetary incentives might help these 
people save face. They might be able to say “I’m getting $10 for asking you this!” 
and this might help them avoid embarrassment and make them feel like savvy 
consumers. Stronger incentives could potentially overcome stronger resistance to 
advice-seeking. Even someone whose self-concept is rooted in their independence 
may seek advice if doing so produces a significant benefit.  
 
E.  Mandating Advice 
 
Although some welfarist policymakers might wish to mandate advice, there are 
several problems with such a proposal. Expert medical and legal advice leaves a 
paper trail. Peer advice does not.236 Without an official means to record peer advice, 
mandating advice would be difficult. Perhaps all policymakers could really mandate 
is that people attest to the fact that advice was sought or received.237 This is not 
completely toothless because people don’t like lying.238 But there are reasons to 
question whether mandating advice will work. 
Mandating advice also comes with increased paternalism and privacy concerns. 
Requiring advice is significantly more paternalistic than merely requiring a micro-
waiting period. It interferes not just in people’s financial lives, but also their personal 
lives and self-concept. People may value the idea that they don’t have to rely on 
others. People may want to insulate their friends from worry, or to keep their 
situation a secret from others for more selfish reasons. This would be difficult to do 
if you had to seek advice about a reverse mortgage or a potential prostate cancer 
treatment.  
These concerns are weighty, but not necessarily insurmountable.239 The law 
does mandate advice, at least in some circumstances. Massachusetts requires 
mortgage counseling for those seeking to enter a reverse mortgage.240 Some states 
require criminal defendants to have the advice of counsel before they plead guilty to 
a capital offense.241 In some states, you cannot waive alimony in a prenup unless 
 
235 Daena J. Goldsmith, Soliciting Advice: The Role of Sequential Placement in 
Mitigating Face Threat, 67 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 1, 5 (2000). 
236 Of course, it would be possible to design a set of forms or other mechanisms to 
verify that peer advice was sought, given, or both.  
237 One could also mandate that the advice-giver sign the relevant contract or provide 
other documentation.  
238 Rachel Barkan, Shahar Ayal & Dan Ariely, Ethical Dissonance, Justifications, and 
Moral Behavior, 6 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 157, 157 (2015) (describing the phenomenon of 
ethical dissonance). 
239 Robertson, supra note 5, at 690 (discussing mandatory second opinions, and finding 
evidence that they work). 
240 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167E, § 7(e) (2020) (“A bank shall not make a reverse 
mortgage [until] the prospective borrower has completed a reverse mortgage counseling 
program.”). 
241 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (2020). 
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you were represented by counsel.242 You cannot reaffirm debt that was discharged 
in bankruptcy without the approval of your attorney.243 Although none of these laws 
implicate advice from friends or family, they nonetheless highlight the possibility 
that, in at least some situations, policymakers might overcome barriers to mandating 
advice.  
 
F.  Promoting Conditions that Facilitate Advice 
 
Various laws could create circumstances or background conditions that make 
spontaneous advice-seeking more likely. Here, the positive potential of advice could 
be an additional reason to support a set of reforms that, on their face, have little to 
do with advice.  
Ethan Leib has argued that the law should do more to support friendships. 
Because friends are a probable source of valuable advice, promoting friendships 
might also promote advice. He offers numerous ways for the law to foster stronger 
norms of friendships:244 
 
We could offer tax breaks or deductions for “friendship expenditures”; we 
could allow “loss of society” damages to friends of those who die from 
tortious conduct; we could establish a “Friends Medical Leave Act” to 
allow friends to leave work to take care of one another during sickness; 
we could allow friends to sue on one another’s behalf and furnish them 
with standing; we could give prisoners rights to see their friends (as we 
do); we could presume to give friends the legal right to make medical 
decisions on our behalf (without a contract giving them that right); and we 
could establish legal rituals to solidify friendships just as we solemnize the 
status of marriage and citizenship—our other associative duties—through 
public oaths and legal documents.245 
 
Some of his suggestions are more closely aligned with advice-seeking than others. 
For example, he argues that friends should have fiduciary duties toward one another, 
perhaps including a duty to keep certain information private.246 This might provide 
a safer space for people to open up about their financial missteps and medical 
conditions.247  
 
242 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (2020). 
243 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(5)(A). 
244 Leib, supra note 196, at 692 (discussing the effects of fiduciary duties on extralegal 
norms). 
245 Id. at 682–83 (footnotes omitted). 
246 Id. at 692–94. 
247 See also Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity 
Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 186 (2013) (recommending privacy laws and 
confidentiality rules as one way to reduce stigma rooted in the revealing one’s BMI and other 
medical facts surrounding obesity); Jennifer A. Neuhauser, Lives of Quiet Desperation: The 
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Reducing the stigma and social discomfort about monetary discussions could 
also help promote financial advice-seeking. Many advocates have proposed 
mandatory disclosure of private salaries as a way to discourage and identify gender 
discrimination.248 Doing so might affect the social norms surrounding salary privacy. 
Although salaries are only one part of a much larger set of money-related topics, 
they strongly implicate the associations between money and self-worth. To the 
extent that salary disclosure laws reduce the stigma of discussing salary, they might 
at least partially help to reduce the stigma of talking about money more generally. 
This in turn, could reduce the barriers to seeking advice on financial matters. 
Understanding this potential link between salary privacy and advice-seeking 
provides another potential reason to support salary disclosure regimes. 
 
G.  Advice as Input 
 
In the sections above, advice was the output that the policymaker sought to 
produce. This section shifts focus. It asks whether courts should take notice of advice 
as an input into determinations like undue influence or unconscionability, and 
whether legal directives might be sensitive to whether people have or could have 
received advice.  
The law already recognizes that advice, or access to it, matters. Sometimes, the 
law only recognizes the impact of expert advice. For example, some states mandate 
that fiancés have a meaningful opportunity to seek counsel before signing a 
prenup.249 Other states preclude certain contract terms if the parties were not 
represented by counsel.250 The law also recognizes the power of non-expert advice, 
in at least a few places. Consider the doctrine of undue influence, which creates an 
affirmative defense to the enforceability of instruments that are grounded in consent, 
like contracts, deeds, and gifts.251 This doctrine recognizes the power of non-expert 
advice in at least two ways.  
 
Conflict Between Military Necessity and Confidentiality, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1003, 1037 
(2011) (“Encouraging soldiers to seek help for psychological issues means the military must 
protect therapist-patient confidentiality as rigorously as that between a chaplain and a soldier 
or an attorney and a client.”). 
248 Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage 
Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 385, 427 (2013); Sarah Lyons, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt Pay-
Secrecy Norms: Analyzing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social 
Norms, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 361, 390–91 (2013); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, 
Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 951, 1020 (2011). 
249 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–36g (a)(4) (2020).  
250 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (2020). 
251 Undue Influence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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First, courts will look to whether the victim was isolated from friends and 
family.252 This is part of a larger inquiry into whether one party was under the 
domination of the other.253 Victims who are isolated are more susceptible to the 
subtle forms of coercion that undue influence seeks to police.254 Victims who still 
maintain relationships with others, and can discuss the relevant contract or deed with 
those other people, are less likely to be susceptible to undue influence.255 In a case 
that sought to set aside gifts to a cult, the First Circuit differentiated between two 
different gifts.256 The court refused to set aside a $1 million gift in part because the 
donor had sought advice from her husband before making it.257 In contrast, the same 
court set aside a $5 million gift in part because the church leader encouraged the 
victim to keep it a secret from her husband.258  
Second, even if there is a clear element of domination in the relationship 
between the parties, some types of advice can negate an undue influence claim. Most 
of the relevant caselaw discusses advice from an independent attorney. So, for 
example, a presumption of undue influence might arise based on the dominant 
position that one person held over another, but receiving independent legal advice 
can “remove[] the cloud of undue influence.”259 Although most cases deal with legal 
advice, they do not require that the advice comes from an attorney. Courts have held 
that independent advice from family members like sisters and mothers can remove 
the cloud of undue influence at least under some circumstances.260 
 
252 See, e.g., Mueller v. Wells, 367 P.3d 580, 585 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (discussing 
efforts to isolate victim from family and friends as relevant to whether presumption of undue 
influence arose). 
253 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.70(a) (2020). 
254 Mary Joy Quinn, Undoing Undue Influence, 24 GENERATIONS 65, 65 (2000) (noting 
that undue influence usually begins by isolating the victim from their family and friends); C. 
Peisah, S. Finkel, K. Shulman, P. Melding, J. Luxenberg, J. Heinik, R. Jacoby, B. Reisberg, 
G. Stoppe, A. Barker, H. Firmino & H. Bennett, The Wills of Older People: Risk Factors for 
Undue Influence, 21 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 7, 10 (2009) (noting that isolation is what 
allows subtle distortions in the truth to take hold). 
255 In re Love, 182 B.R. 161, 174 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995) (“The final factor this Court 
will consider is an attempt by the spiritual leader to isolate the follower from his or her friends 
and family. . . . This factor additionally weighs heavily in support of a finding of undue 
influence, as the concern and advice of Plaintiff’s family and friends would have helped to 
somewhat diffuse the dominance and control Defendant exercised over Plaintiff.” (emphasis 
added)). 
256 In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 642–45 (1st Cir. 1989). 
257 Id. at 643. 
258 Id. at 643–44. 
259 Gaeth v. Newman, 199 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Neb. 1972). 
260 Weil v. Weil, 236 P.2d 159, 169–70 (Cal. 1951) (overcoming a presumption of 
undue influence when signatory’s sister advised her and was with her when she signed the 
deed); see also Barham v. Cooper, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00200, 1997 WL 542922, at *5 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997) (finding that advice from mother was not relevant because 
she had a conflict of interest); but see Giacobbi v. Anselmi, 87 A.2d 748, 756–57 (N.J. Super. 
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Other areas of law could also consider the impact of advice. The 
unconscionability doctrine generally requires an “absence of meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”261 The inquiry into “meaningful choice” could 
productively include an inquiry into advice. Sometimes people who received advice 
about the contract will have a greater degree of choice. Recall that advisors generally 
come up with more creative alternatives and advice generally points people in 
positive directions. Of course, the particular facts drive decisions on 
unconscionability, and advice will not necessarily defeat an unconscionability claim. 
But the welfare-enhancing nature of peer advice suggests that courts should add 
advice to the list of potential important factors to consider in unconscionability 
claims. Similarly, courts could more explicitly consider advice when determining 
whether people entered prenuptial and postnuptial agreements voluntarily.262 Advice 
is also relevant to whether differentials in bargaining power existed, which tends to 
heighten the burden faced by the person attempting to enforce the prenup or 
postnup.263  
The above examples show how advice might be relevant as an input into an ex 
post determination made by a court. It could also be relevant, at least in a rough way, 
to ex ante regulation. For decisions where the probability of receiving advice is 
low—perhaps this is true for intensely personal decisions or those relating to 
stigmatized actions—the law could require greater consumer protections. These 
could include longer cooling off periods, longer waiting periods, restrictions on 
particular contract terms, etc. For decisions where advice-seeking is more common, 
lesser protections might be sufficient. The next Part will discuss more-nuanced ways 
to incorporate advice into ex ante regulations. It does so by discussing the futuristic 
potential for personalizing law. 
 
IV.  HYBRID ADVICE: COMBINING PEER ADVICE AND AI ADVICE 
 
A growing literature explores the impact of big data and AI for legal regulation. 
This Part highlights one facet of this body of scholarship: the possibility that AI will 
 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (rejecting the idea that a realtor’s advice was sufficient in part because he 
was not a lawyer). 
261 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed. 2020).  
262 See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 759 S.E.2d 468, 472 (W. Va. 2014) (“The validity of a 
prenuptial agreement is dependent upon its valid procurement, which requires its having been 
executed voluntarily, with knowledge of its content and legal effect, under circumstances 
free of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation; however, although advice of independent counsel 
at the time parties enter into a prenuptial agreement helps demonstrate that there has been no 
fraud, duress or misrepresentation, and that the agreement was entered into knowledgeably 
and voluntarily, such independent advice of counsel is not a prerequisite to 
enforceability . . . .”). 
263 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 353 (N.H. 2003) (“Prenuptial 
agreements that result from such a vast disparity in bargaining power must meet a high 
standard of procedural fairness.”). 
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become sophisticated enough to provide accurate personalized advice. Even in a 
world where this “AI advice” is a reality, peer advice maintains several 
advantages.264 Accordingly, this Part illustrates several hybrid approaches that take 
advantage of the unique benefits of both AI advice and peer advice.  
 
A.  Imagining Personalized Law and AI Advice 
 
Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of legal scholarship exploring 
the possibility of personalized law.265 This literature generally takes an optimistic 
view of technological progress and envisions a world in which AI sorts through 
massive amounts of data about each and every person to generate legal directives 
that are personalized for each person and every situation.266 This marriage of big 
data and AI is a potent combination. Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett coined 
the term “micro-directive” to describe the potential ability of a future AI to generate 
different rules for different people, all in real time.267 For example, everyone’s now-
always-connected car might receive speed limits that apply only to the particular 
driver at the particular time.268 That speed limit could change if the weather changes, 
or if the AI detects erratic driving, or even if the AI learns that you forgot to drink 
coffee that morning.269 Mandatory disclosures could also be personalized in useful 
ways. For example, warnings could be tailored to each person’s literacy and 
numeracy, and medical disclosures could highlight the side effects that are relevant 
 
264 See generally Williams, supra note 20.  
265 Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2013) 
(“[P]ersonalized default rules are the wave of the future . . . .”); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
1417, 1418–19 (2014) (personalized default rules and disclosures); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 628, 636–46 (2016) 
(negligence standards); Casey & Niblett, supra note 19, at 1412 (speed limits and medical 
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to specific patients.270 People with certain personality traits might be assigned 
different mandatory contract terms to reflect their differential susceptibility to 
aggressive sales tactics.271 Nudges and default rules could also be personalized. In 
an only-partially-tongue-and-cheek example, Ariel Porat and Lior Strahilevitz 
suggest that if AI combs through data and finds that most heterosexual vegan men 
with Ph.D.s in philosophy take their wife’s last name, then this could be the default 
legal regime that governs those people.272 
This future may be closer than we think. AI can detect skin cancers as well as 
dermatologists.273 AI can predict divorce as well as trained therapists, and the AI can 
do it based solely on subtle inflections of the spouses’ voices.274 In many other areas 
AI can do things humans never dreamed possible. AI can tell your sex and age just 
by analyzing the electrical patterns in your heart.275 A Google AI can look at just 
your retina and determine your sex, whether you smoke, and your risk of a heart 
attack.276 AI can already beat the best human masters in the world at games like 
chess, Go, and Jeopardy.277 Given this impressive list of accomplishments, it is not 
unreasonable to predict that AI will one day be a powerful tool for policymakers to 
tap into. 
In a companion piece, I explored personalized advice as a novel addition to the 
landscape of personalized law.278 An AI may know better than you the probability 
that you will miss a credit card payment. Accordingly, it might advise against credit 
cards with high late payment penalties. Scraping cell phone and social media data 
will allow that AI to predict even your basic personality traits,279 which themselves 
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correlate with a number of outcomes that we have trouble predicting for ourselves. 
Taking an optimistic view of technological progress, AI will someday generate more 
accurate advice than even one’s friends and family could. I called this AI advice, 
and argued that AI advice has significant advantages over disclosures or default 
rules.280 
This Part maintains the optimistic view on technological progress that is 
common in the literature on personalized law. The reader may then wonder: What 
good is peer advice if, as assumed, accurate personalized AI advice is available? The 
next section answers that question.  
 
B.  Enduring Benefits of Peer Advice 
 
Even in a future of accurate, personalized, AI advice, peer advice is a resource 
that policymakers should tap into. Sometimes the identity of the messenger yields 
important benefits that an AI may not be able to capture. Further, peer advice avoids 
concerns about overly-centralized influence and governmental influence.  
The messenger matters. The allure of AI advice is that it will have exceedingly 
accurate content. The advice will recommend the right path.281 But regardless of the 
accuracy of its content, advice can be packaged in ways that make people more or 
less likely to heed it. Peer advice has an advantage here. People are more likely to 
listen to advice or credit factual assertions when they trust the speaker.282 For high 
stake decisions, trust is more a function of emotional connection, and less about 
expertise.283 Even holding trust constant, emotional connections allow others to 
influence us. Friends and family can influence us in ways that strangers cannot, 
regardless of how much we believe the stranger is an expert in whatever field is most 
relevant to the decision at hand. I may ignore a trusted expert who insists that I put 
more money into my retirement account, but I may not feel as free to ignore my 
spouse or parents when they make similar demands. Until we develop emotional 
attachments to AI, such that we feel bad for disappointing it and want to make it 
 
Social Network Structure, Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous 
Computing—UbiComp (Sept. 5–8, 2013), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/9 
2394/Pentland_Friends%20don%27t.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/9GK 
V-RXUB] (internal citation omitted). 
280 See generally Williams, supra note 20. 
281 Of course, this assumes some consensus about which decisions are better. See supra 
note 187 and accompanying text. An AI could be limited to offering advice only in areas 
where we have such a consensus. See John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson & 
Brigitte C. Madrian, How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787, 1793 (2008) 
(“Governments could play a constructive advisory role if (1) their advice is only given in 
circumstances when the many different measures of normative preferences discussed above 
tend to coincide, and (2) their advice is offered without any obligation to obey . . . .”). 
282 Van Swol et al., supra note 136, at 28. 
283 See Mellina da Silva Terres, Cristiane Pizzutti dos Santos & Kenny Basso, 
Antecedents of the Client’s Trust in Low Versus High-Consequence Decisions, 29 J. SERVS. 
MKTG. 26, 34 (2015). 
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proud, it will not be able to fully capture the packaging benefits of peer advice. 
Further, the emotional supports that friends and family provide may not translate 
well into the context of AI advice. Friends commonly add encouragements and 
affirmations to advice to make it more palatable. A friend who says “You can do it!” 
is showing their support. If an AI said this, it might feel empty or condescending. A 
friend might point out all the good things you do for others in order to bolster your 
self-esteem, enhance your self-control, and reduce your potential defensiveness.284 
A friend who notices all of those things you did is attentive and caring. An AI that 
notices them is creepy and invasive.285 We want to “be seen” by our friends but 
perhaps not by an AI. 
This leads to a tradeoff. To simplify greatly, one might have to choose between 
incredibly accurate advice that only some people will listen to and decent (but not 
optimal) advice that most people will listen to. There is no way to make this choice 
in the abstract. But there are two preliminary reasons to consider peer advice rather 
than relying solely on AI advice. First, peer advice is decentralized. Second, peer 
advice is generated without government influence.  
Centralized influence is potentially dangerous. If one AI or one set of 
algorithms determines the advice that people receive, then sophisticated parties 
might attempt to influence that advice. These concerns exist both in and outside of 
the government context. In the corporate context, we might fear that Amazon or 
Google might steer people to its own products rather than the products of its rivals. 
In the government context, we might fear something akin to agency capture. 
Sophisticated interests might try to influence the advice that the AI generates either 
by altering some of its basic programming or influencing the inputs that it uses to 
generate advice.  
Decentralized advice largely avoids these dangers. If Google or Amazon want 
to influence peer advice about their products—namely, word of mouth endorsements 
or recommendations286—they cannot just tweak their own recommendation 
algorithms. They would have to convince massive numbers of consumers to spread 
a particular recommendation to their friends and family. This is not easy. It is also 
not necessarily objectionable. If Amazon convinces people to sing the praises of 
their Fire Tablet, it most likely does so by making people who own those tablets 
very happy. That is, by creating a good product that gets people excited. This is a 
good thing. Decentralized advice, therefore, makes manipulation harder and 
channels attempted influence into productive pursuits.287  
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287 Of course, manipulation is still possible. For example, Amazon may give free 
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Regardless of whether advice is more or less centralized, some may object to 
governmental attempts to influence choice. For example, they may object to policies 
that interfere with the market regardless of whether they are pursued by cities, states, 
or the federal government. This objection does not apply to peer advice. No 
government body can control the content or packaging of peer advice. Of course, 
the government can try to influence peer advice. Local governments may conduct 
information campaigns encouraging childhood vaccination. But influencing public 
opinion is tricky. Again, the decentralized aspects of peer advice make it difficult 
for any entity to control the content.  
The discussion above suggests that peer advice maintains some advantages 
over AI advice. This Part now turns to how AI advice and peer advice could 
productively coexist.  
 
C.  Two Simple Integrations 
 
1.  Either/Or 
 
At the most basic level, an AI could determine when to rely on AI advice, and 
when to facilitate peer advice. Some people may be particularly unlikely to follow 
AI advice, or particularly in need of the unique emotional support that peer advice 
can offer. Similarly, in some situations social support may be more important than 
accuracy. These dispositional and situational factors interact in complex ways. But 
an AI sophisticated enough to offer accurate personalized advice may also be 
sophisticated enough to predict when natural advisors might have more impact. One 
could imagine the AI running countless experiments and testing which retirement-
savings-oriented interventions lead people to save most. It might learn that, for some 
subset of the population,288 advising people to seek advice from a friend works better 
than providing specific personalized advice, and perhaps even works better than the 
combination of the two. Of course, more customizations are possible. The AI may 
mine your email, Facebook profile, and location data and conclude that you have no 
close friends. If so, advice to seek advice may not be helpful. In contrast, if the AI 
predicts that you have numerous friends who have experience with the relevant 
decision, advice to seek advice is likely to be quite useful. 
 
2.  Further Personalization  
 
In addition to broadly deciding when to use peer advice and when to use AI 
advice, an AI could customize each of the various ways of promoting peer advice. 
For example, asking “What would your spouse say about this?” is not useful if you 
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are not married, but could be very useful if you are. Asking “What would your 
friends recommend?” may produce different results depending on who your friends 
are. Sometimes it might be better to ask “What advice would you give your friends, 
if they were faced with this decision?” A sophisticated AI may someday be able to 
predict which types of interventions lead to better decisions. 
An AI could also personalize who receives incentives to seek advice and what 
those incentives are. For some people, paying a no-advice penalty may be 
motivating; for others, an advice-bonus might work better.289 For still others, non-
monetary incentives might work best.290 For example, Jim might be offered a coupon 
for a beer at his favorite bar if he seeks advice. This might be especially motivating 
for Jim, and it might also indirectly harness some power of social connections. When 
Jim redeems his coupon, he may well tell people that he got it by asking for advice. 
Here, again, we see the possibility to design systems that are likely to be self-
advertising.  
Personalizing mandates is also promising because it reduces the strength of 
various objections to them. Mandating opportunities to seek advice imposes small 
delay costs. Mandating advice itself imposes large privacy costs. Personalization 
could greatly reduce the number of people subjected to these mandates. The more 
that these mandates are used only for people and situations where less invasive 
regulations either have failed or would fail, the more likely that they offer a 
defensible balance of welfare and autonomy. 
Finally, personalization can affect when advice is used as an input to law. When 
judges take access to advice into account in undue influence claims, they do so in 
the context of an ex post trial with discovery and witnesses. This allows judges to 
make an informed judgment about the nature and degree of advice that a person 
received. Personalization offers the potential to apply these nuanced judgments to 
ex ante regulation. These personalizations could, for example, apply to a common 
feature of consumer finance law: cooling off periods.291 In their non-personalized 
form, all people might have to wait ten days before obtaining a second payday loan, 
or they might have three days to cancel a contract formed during an encounter with 
a door-to-door salesman.292 In their personalized form, each person might have 
different cooling off periods for different products, and those might even change 
depending on the other features of the decision environment. For example, cooling 
off periods might be longer for people with smaller or less tight-knit social networks. 
One could even imagine different rules depending on whether you have sought 
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292 See id. at 334–36. 
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advice that big data could capture and verify. People who solicited advice on 
Facebook about payday loans, for example, might have shorter cooling off periods. 
Payday lenders could then offer those people cash more quickly or at a reduced rate 
to account for the lesser burden they face when loaning to those customers.  
 
D.  Two Complex Integrations 
 
In addition to the integrations described above, there are many more nuanced 
combinations. For the sake of illustration, this section will discuss two of the near-
infinite possibilities. First, an AI could influence the content of peer advice by 
steering you to particular advisors. Second, an AI could try to launder its content by 
speaking through a peer advisor. 
 
1.  Peer Advice from AI-Selected Advisors 
 
For several of the strategies outlined in the last Part, it would be theoretically 
possible to select a particular person to act as an advisor. Instead of generically 
advising you to seek advice from “friends or family”293 an AI might advise you to 
seek advice from “your friend Jane.” Similarly, an AI might advise you to simulate 
advice from a particular person, provide incentives to seek advice from particular 
people, or mandate that you receive advice from particular people. For example, an 
AI might select advisors with particular experience. Alternatively, an AI might 
mandate that you seek advice from people with similar personality traits and 
preferences to you. An AI could strategically select the source of simulated advice 
as well. We might predict that asking people, “What would Satan do?” might lead 
them down a different path than asking them, “What would Jesus do?” Similarly, 
asking them, “What would Jane do?” might lead them to different results than asking 
them, “What would Stan do?” If Jane is especially conscientious and risk averse, 
then asking people to simulate her advice will probably result in more conscientious 
and less risky choices. If Stan has a higher risk tolerance, then asking what he would 
do might lead people toward riskier choices. 
These strategic selections create two main concerns. First, this practice might 
create externalities by burdening certain people. Just because Jane gives good advice 
does not necessarily mean we should be asking her to field 100 texts a day asking 
for that advice. Second, privacy concerns emerge. Jane may not want the AI advising 
others to “Ask Jane, because she lost her house by accidentally signing an adjustable 
rate mortgage.” Even if the AI does not provide this reason or explanation of why it 
selected Jane, people might eventually pick up on the AI’s pattern of advising people 
 
293 This is already a form of strategic selection because it points you to a set of people 
who are likely to want to give good advice. But the possibility of strategic selection only 
really blossoms with an AI that knows enough about your friends, family, and other contacts 
that it can further customize the advisor. 
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to seek advice from people with relevant experience. So just saying “Ask Stan” in 
the context of vasectomies might tip people off that Stan got one recently.294  
These privacy concerns do not apply to all contexts. Implying that someone got 
a vasectomy may be far more invasive than implying that they spent a lot of time 
thinking about how to diversify their retirement funds. Similarly, implying that Stan 
is great at understanding probability and risk is hardly an offensive invasion of his 
privacy. Policymakers or the AI itself can distinguish between instances where 
privacy concerns are relatively high and those where privacy concerns are lower.  
Further, neither privacy nor externality concerns apply as strongly to simulated 
advice. Suppose an AI asks you to “Imagine what Jane would say about this.” It is 
unlikely that this would reveal any private information about Jane. It would be hard 
to infer that Jane was selected because she had some particular experience in the 
past. If the advisee does not know that Jane had the relevant experience, it will not 
affect the simulated advice, and hence would be irrelevant to the AI’s choice.295 
Selecting Jane as the subject of simulated advice is also less likely to burden Jane. 
Of course, it is possible that people will follow-up their imagined advice with an 
actual phone call to Jane to seek her actual advice. But given how much even small 
transaction costs affect behavior, this seems unlikely. It is also possible that people 
will come to resent Jane, like they might resent a teacher’s pet. But again, this seems 
speculative. 
Regardless, both privacy concerns and externalities can be mitigated by giving 
people some measure of control over how the AI operates. Some people may not 
want others to know that they lost their house by signing a mortgage agreement with 
hidden terms, but others might want the chance to save others from that fate. 
Accordingly, there could be some system for people to set customized limits around 
the AI’s use of them as advisors. Personalization can also mitigate externalities, and 
in the same way. We could allow people to add or remove themselves from the list 
of persons that the AI could recommend as an advisor, or set other customized limits.  
 
2.  AI-Influenced Peer Advice 
 
The previous subsections addressed the demand side for advice. AI advice 
could also seek to alter supply. Imagine an AI issuing you some piece of AI advice 
 
294 A third concern also exists. Strategically selecting advisors centralizes control over 
advice, at least to some degree. For those who objected to AI advice on centralization 
grounds, strategic selection may be objectionable as well. This objection is weak. The weight 
of this concern is proportional to how much control the government has over the ultimate 
advice that people receive. If the benefits of packaging only occur when it selects a friend or 
family member, then the government will be quite constrained in its ability to control the 
content of the message. This is especially true today, when friendship networks are much 
smaller than they were in the past, and much more homogeneous. 
295 It is possible that this will create some privacy concerns because the AI might 
recommend people with relevant experience in the hopes that the target knows about this 
experience and can incorporate it into their simulated advice. If people predict that the AI 
does this, then they may again infer experience from recommendations.  
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and simultaneously informing a friend or family member that you have received this 
advice. This might trigger two effects. First, the friend or family member might think 
that the advice is sound. Second, they might call you to tell you that. An example 
may help. An AI provides you with personalized advice to contribute the maximum 
amount to your retirement account, or to get a flu shot, or to avoid adjustable rate 
mortgages. It also notifies your mother that it gave you this advice. What might your 
mom do? She might call you to make sure you follow the advice. Of course, she 
might disagree with the advice. This is not necessarily bad. It presents a check on 
centralized government influence. Regardless, it stimulates thought and discussion 
about the issue, which themselves can lead to better decision-making.  
Looking at the above example from a different angle, the AI could launder its 
advice. That is, the AI could send messages that try to convince your mother to give 
you advice that matches what the AI would have recommended. The ultimate goal 
would be to have the AI’s advice content get delivered through her. Here, unlike the 
discussion above, the AI is not only trying to trigger advice, but also trying to 
exercise direct influence over its content. The first target of behavioral change is 
your mother. The AI would test various ways of convincing her that it is offering 
good advice, and convincing her to pass along that advice to you. The second target 
would be you, responding to the advice she provided.  
Of course, these hybrid systems lead to several objections. Privacy and 
externality concerns are particularly powerful. It may be hard to justify both 
revealing personal information about you to your friends and inducing them to worry 
about you just to improve your ultimate decision. But an opt-in regime might be 
defensible. People could sign up to participate in this type of system, as the advisee, 
advisor, or both. It’s not hard to believe that at least some people would opt in. Some 
spouses share their real-time cell phone location information with one another, 
others don’t. Some spouses share all of their passwords, others don’t. People who 
might want more advice, but know that they will often fail to seek it because of time 
constraints or embarrassment, might well precommit to the laundered advice 
described in this subsection, at least in some decision domains.  
 
E.  Summary 
 
Comparing AI advice to everyday peer advice reveals new advantages of the 
latter. Not only is advice-giving a powerful debiasing tool, but everyday advisors 
are likely to package advice in ways that make advisees more likely to hear and heed 
it. Even in a futuristic world with accurate AI advice, peer advice is a useful resource 
for policymakers to tap into, and AI increases the number of options for doing so.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has sought to resurrect an ancient technology for improving the 
welfare of others: advice from friends and family. This longstanding and simple idea 
now has a burgeoning psychological literature to support it. Advice-giving promises 
to be one of the most powerful debiasing strategies ever discovered. Advisors 
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routinely offer advice that is unaffected by the fundamental attribution error, 
confirmation bias, omission bias, betrayal aversion, loss aversion, probability 
neglect, and hyperbolic discounting. That is, people who routinely succumb to biases 
when making decisions for themselves think far more clearly when generating 
advice for others. Advisors also find more creative solutions and see the forest rather 
than the trees. These newly-confirmed benefits suggest that peer advice could be a 
powerful resource for improving decision-making. In a world with frayed social 
connections and increasingly small friend networks, the benefits of advice are harder 
for many people to capture. Accordingly, policymakers should seriously consider 
whether and how to promote advice-seeking and advice-giving. They could do so 
with softer and harder forms of intervention—everything from merely advising 
people to seek advice to mandating that people seek it. The prospect of personalizing 
law in general, and personalizing advice in particular through big data and AI, offers 
the possibility of tailoring these interventions to account for each individual’s 
personality type, decision environment, and the unique resources that their particular 
friend network offers. These personalizations mitigate various objections to harder 
forms of intervention, and make softer ones more effective. Until this level of 
personalization is possible, and even after it is, policymakers can do a great deal of 
good by simply promoting everyday advice from friends and family. Sometimes, the 
old ways are the best ways, or at the very least, the old ways continue to offer unique 
opportunities that should be embraced rather than squandered. 
